Climate 411

Edward L. Glaeser makes the case for simplicity in addressing climate change. I couldn’t agree more with his premise. The basic economics are indeed simple. Climate change might be the largest market failure the world has ever seen. To correct it, put the right incentives in place: correct the fact that we currently treat the atmosphere as a free sewer for our global warming pollution. Problem solved.

The how and especially the politics are not quite as straight-forward. Glaeser bemoans that the proposed American Power Act has 987 pages and identifies three culprits: that the Act tries to do more than just put a price on carbon, that it uses a cap-and-trade system rather than a tax, and that the problem has an important international dimension. He is broadly right on one and three but not on two: the issue of a cap versus a tax.

A firm limit on global warming pollution does not make the law more complicated. It makes it better.

First, a cap sets a firm upper limit on pollution. Glaeser acknowledges as much by saying that “fixing the number of permits may actually be the right thing to do.” It is.

Second, it’s politics, stupid. There is a good reason why the U.S. tax code has 17,000 pages. Proposing a tax on paper is simple. Getting it through the political process is a different matter altogether. Most significantly, every tax credit, every exemption means an increase in pollution. That’s not the case with a cap. While politics does what politics does best—worry about the allocation of allowances—the upper pollution limit stands.

Third, and contrary to what is sometimes argued by tax advocates, a cap creates a more stable policy environment. Certainty is the sine qua non for energy policy.  While it is true that a cap and trade program can introduce short-term variability into the carbon price, that is unlikely to matter for investments in energy infrastructure.  What matters is certainty over the long run. Capital-intensive investment decisions take years if not decades to pay for themselves (think about a new electric power station).

A well designed cap—especially one with a price floor, which this Act would include—creates this kind of certainty, by guaranteeing that emissions must go down and, therefore, that emissions reductions will have value. A tax is easily revoked, altered, or put “on holiday.” A cap has durability. And even if it does have to be amended, market foresight will allow smooth transitions, much more so than a tax would.

Fourth is the international dimension, Glaeser’s last point. A cap makes international coordination easier. It also creates incentives for developing countries to cap their own emissions, in order to gain from selling allowances into a U.S. market and create win-win-win situations for themselves, U.S. companies and consumers, and the atmosphere.

All four of these reasons also appear in America’s Climate Choices, a terrific new study just released by the National Academy of Sciences. It provides the scientific closing argument for the debate unfolding in the Senate. The science is compelling, the urgency to act is clear, and the main solution is equally apparent: put a price on global warming pollution, ideally through a firm, declining cap on emissions.

In his insightful post, Rob Stavins makes two key points regarding the allocation of emission allowances under climate legislation like that introduced last week by Senators Kerry and Lieberman.

First, Stavins addresses head-on the concerns that some progressives have toward the allocation provisions in the bill, asking in the title of his post: “Is the Kerry-Lieberman Allowance Allocation a Corporate Give-Away?”  To answer this question, Stavins carries out a careful breakdown of the allowance allocation in the Kerry-Lieberman bill.  He shows that the vast majority of emission allowances (more than 80% over the duration of the bill) — goes to energy consumers and public purposes (including deficit reduction).  That hardly sounds like a windfall to big corporations!  Indeed, if you add it up, the largest fraction of allowance value (43% in total, according to my calculations) goes to households, through an energy refund to low-income consumers, a tax credit to working families, a universal trust fund for all Americans, and allowances that are allocated to local electricity and gas utilities for the benefit of their customers.

As Stavins’s calculations illustrate, what matters most in terms of allocation is not whether the allowances are auctioned or given away for free, but who receives the value.  (For example, of the allowance value that is directed to households, about four-fifths comes as auction revenue, while the remainder is from the allowances allocated for free to local utilities.)

Even so, some progressives worry that free allocation is at odds with cutting emissions.  After all, if you give emitters something for free, doesn’t that eliminate the “price on carbon” that creates an economic incentive to cut carbon emissions?  The answer, actually, is “no.”

Here’s where Stavins’s second point comes in.  As he explains, it is a basic result of economics that even when allowances are distributed for free, they will still have a value (since they can be sold on a market). In economic terms, each time a company uses an allowance, there is an “opportunity cost” involved — the foregone profit they could have gotten from selling the allowance instead.  As a result, companies will still have a strong economic incentive to find cost-effective ways to reduce their carbon emissions — so that the economic performance of the bill is basically unaffected.  (It’s also worth pointing out that the environmental performance of the bill is also unaffected, since that is determined by the cap — not by how allowances are allocated.)

To put the same point a bit differently, the value of allowances doesn’t depend on how they are allocated.  Rather, allowances have value because they are in scarce supply — thanks to the cap on emissions.  The tighter is the cap, the greater is the scarcity, and the higher is the value of allowances, all else equal.

Of course, there are a few nuances worth noting.  First, from a strictly economic point of view, the best use of allowance value would be to use it to lower distortionary taxes on labor and capital, giving the overall economy an added boost.  However, getting such a “double dividend” requires not just auctioning the allowances, but using the revenue in a specific way to cut other taxes — something that has yet to generate significant political momentum.  In other words, acknowledging the possibility of a double dividend doesn’t undermine the main point that what matters is how the value of allowances is allocated, not simply whether allowances are auctioned or freely allocated.

Second, some ways of allocating allowances can affect incentives.  This can cut both ways.  In theory, using allowance value to reduce electricity rates can undermine incentives to conserve energy; this suggests that it would be preferable to compensate households for higher energy costs by sending them a lump-sum rebate rather than cutting their marginal price.  In other contexts, allowance allocation is deliberately designed to affect incentives.  For example, energy-intensive, trade-exposed manufacturers are given allocations that are tied to their output and to the average emissions intensity of their sector.  As research by Carolyn Fischer at Resources for the Future and others has shown, such “output-based rebates” manage to preserve the incentive to reduce emissions, while helping to keep manufacturing in this country and prevent “emissions leakage” to countries without a carbon price.

The bottom line is that the distinction between free allocation and auction makes little difference for the environmental or economic performance of the bill.  That’s a key point well worth keeping in mind in the coming debates over climate legislation.

Climate Progress highlights Tom Friedman’s New York Times column “No Fooling Mother Nature” where Tom describes how

“There is only one meaningful response to the horrific oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and that is for America to stop messing around when it comes to designing its energy and environmental future. The only meaningful response to this man-made disaster is a man-made energy bill that would finally put in place an American clean-energy infrastructure that would set our country on a real, long-term path to ending our addiction to oil.”

The New Republic showcases a new report by the Energy Information Administration which shows that CO2 emissions in the United States are down 10% from 2005 levels.

On E2, Kerry and Lieberman say they are set to unveil the climate bill on Wednesday.

The Financial Times poses the question that is in the back of everyone’s minds:  “If we can fix the ozone layer, why do we struggle in tackling climate change?”