Climate 411

The Key to Creating Jobs: The Capital on the Sidelines

During President Obama’s speech this week at Carnegie Mellon University, he signaled emphatically that he would go after the votes to pass a clean energy bill this year, assuring that while “the votes may not be there right now… I intend to find them in the coming months… and we will get it done.”This is exactly the sort of presidential resolve that’s needed. The president went on to say,

[T]he only way the transition to clean energy will succeed is if the private sector is fully invested in this future – if capital comes off the sidelines and the ingenuity of our entrepreneurs is unleashed. And the only way to do that is by finally putting a price on carbon pollution.

He got it exactly right – investors are waiting to see what Congress decides. And once we do set a price for carbon pollution, a huge amount of money will be back in play to invest in clean energy.

This infusion of capital is critical to job creation. Every study that is done to assess job creation potential of the new energy economy builds off assumptions about how much capital will be devoted to energy efficiency, renewables, and the like. For example, the June 2009 University of Massachusetts report “The Economic Benefits of Investing in Clean Energy” assumed that the provisions of the House-passed American Clean Energy Leadership Act (ACELA), building on stimulus funds already committed, would bring $150 billion in new investment per year for the next decade – creating 2.5 million jobs. If that capital came 100% from the oil and gas sector, the net job creation (net of jobs lost in oil and gas) would be 1.7 million jobs.

While I believe some of that capital will come from diverting money from oil and gas, not all of it will. And, given unemployment numbers, there is quite a bit of capital sitting on the sidelines.

But don’t just take it from me, listen to a venture capitalist. In his testimony before the House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, delivered April 2008, Mission Point venture capitalist Dan Abbasi noted:

We testified before Congress that we and other leading investment firms have mobilized billions of dollars from blue-chip investors with a mandate to invest in the decarbonization of our economy. And we stand ready to do much more if Congress passes a law to set some long overdue rules of the road.

A long-term stable price signal for carbon is imperative to encourage innovation and to promote investment. It needs to be long enough to reward investors for locking up their capital in asset-intensive, long lead-time energy projects and taking on the associated technical, construction and market risks. Moreover, only a long-term carbon price will motivate investment in the supply chain companies that must scale up and thrive if we’re to drive down the price of low-carbon energy.

While we’re finding some attractive investments today, candidly we are also holding back a lot of “dry powder” — or uninvested capital – and the economic downturn is only partly to blame. The biggest factor is continued uncertainty over whether Congress will pass a bill capping carbon. Renewable loan guarantees, grants and tax credits from the stimulus package are helping us to finance the supply of low-carbon solutions, but without a cap we won’t see the market demand needed to fully pull those solutions through.

In Europe, after the passage of their Emissions Trading System, the ETS, James Graham, Director of the Commercial Division for Camco International, noted that “If you look at the pricing for credits from renewable energy projects before and after the creation of the EU ETS, the pricing was much higher afterwards. Higher prices means more projects are happening. More capital is being allocated to investing in renewables because of enhanced returns from the addition of a carbon revenue stream to such projects.”

According to Clean Tech Venture Network, California saw a 20% compound annual growth rate in clean technology investments in 2002 after passage of a Renewable Portfolio Standard, but that jumped to 98% compound annual growth rate when AB 32 (putting a price on carbon) was introduced and passed 18 months later. (Clean Tech Venture Network data)

Last month, columnist David Brooks discovered capital sitting on the sidelines as well. If the American Power Act (the Senate version of comprehensive energy and climate legislation passes with a price on carbon) passed, utility executives noted just 4 weeks ago that they would move capital off the sidelines:

“Regarding wind energy investment at our NextEra Energy Resources subsidiary, we think we might invest about $1.5 billion to $2 billion more per year. Regarding solar, we think NextEra Energy Resources might invest $500 million or more per year outside of Florida and that our Florida Power & Light subsidiary might invest about $1 billion a year inside Florida.” — Lew Hay, chief executive of the power provider FPL Group.

“[NRG] could double the number of clean energy projects, from 17 to 36; it could triple the megawatts of clean generating capacity it is planning to add; it could produce three times as much nuclear power and 40 times as much coal with carbon capture and sequestration. — David Crane, the CEO of NRG Energy.

“The Renewable Portfolio Standard should be considered a short-term technique to “jump-start” a new industry but seen as a temporary incentive.  In contrast, monetizing carbon and placing a cap on carbon signals a major shift in the industry framework and provides a long-term market signal that is very different than the RPS approach,” according to BJ Stanbery, founder, Chairman and Chief Strategy Officer of HelioVolt, a Texas-based manufacturer of thin film solar.

Getting this capital off the sidelines and into clean energy projects is a clear path to job creation. But it’s not just about getting capital off the sidelines, it’s about keeping capital here in the U.S. Who can forget Jeff Immelt saying at a Wall Street Journal event in 2008 that “If the U.S. doesn’t buy my wind turbines, I’ll go to Turkey.” In this economy, we can hardly afford to have the next generation of energy projects shipped overseas. The U.S. can and should be a leader in clean energy, and with the right investment, we can make it happen.

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Blog highlights from the past few days

E2 shares President Obama’s plan to reduce emissions from the transportation sector.

“The president is directing EPA and DOT to create a first-ever national policy to increase fuel efficiency and decrease greenhouse gas pollution from medium- and heavy-duty trucks for model years 2014-2018, and an extension of the national program for cars and light-duty trucks to model year 2017 and beyond,”

a White House official said. Grist has the details.

Michael Levi comments on a new World Bank working paper that looks at renewable energy projections from the last 36 years. The report seems to conclude that we are not great at long-run energy forecasting. Levi asks

“can you see a trend? If not, that’s because there pretty much isn’t one. Here’s their fit:”

On Mother Jones, Kate Sheppard laments that in his weekly address,

“Obama yet again missed an opportunity to talk about how the spill illustrates the need to end reliance on fossil fuels. Instead, he gave passing acknowledgment to clean energy, while maintaining that we need to drill for oil here in the US.”

Sheppard acknowledges that Obama is still engaged in the issue. In his speech, Obama did say that

“One of the reasons I ran for President was to put America on the path to energy independence, and I have not wavered from that commitment. To achieve that goal, we must pursue clean energy and energy efficiency, and we’ve taken significant steps to do so.”

However Sheppard makes the point that Obama is still falling short.

“This would have been a perfect point to restate the need for Congress to pass a climate and energy bill this year. But Obama did not.”

Sheppard ends her piece by asking the President to transition his rhetorical calls for “energy independence” into action.

“There will never be a better illustration of why our energy system is dirty and dangerous than the current disaster in the Gulf. But Congress needs Obama to step up and lead to prevent this opportunity from going to waste. So far, he hasn’t.”

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New evidence on the job impacts of climate policy: Why now is the right time to cap carbon

This was originally posted on the Huffington Post.

Opponents of climate legislation often claim that now is the wrong time to put a price on carbon, with the economy just emerging from a recession.  But a must-read study released today by the well-respected, nonpartisan Peterson Institute for International Economics shows that the reverse is actually true: passing climate legislation would provide the economy with a much-needed shot in the arm.

Trevor Houser and his co-authors use a widely respected economic model to analyze the impact on the U.S. economy of the American Power Act, the energy and climate legislation introduced last week by Senators Kerry and Lieberman. The study estimates that the legislation would spur investment in the electric power sector — in turn adding over 200,000 jobs to the economy during the next decade relative to a “business as usual” scenario without policy. The reason is that when labor and capital are underemployed, as they are now, a policy that spurs new investment in the private sector will create jobs rather than simply taking them from other sectors. This lends quantitative support to the argument I’ve been making for over a year, which is that the fragile state of the U.S. economy strengthens the case for a cap on carbon rather than weakening it.

To understand why this is important, it helps to step back and think about what we know about the link between climate legislation and employment. The usual debates about the job impacts of climate legislation tend to follow parallel tracks that never intersect, with opponents focusing on jobs that might be lost, and proponents focusing on jobs that would be gained — but little analysis of what the net impact would be. So what would that net impact be?

There are a couple of ways to think about this issue, depending on what time frame you are looking at. In the long run, the American economy is likely to gain from taking the lead in the clean energy revolution, just as our economy has always benefited from technological leadership. The world is heading onto a low-carbon path, and huge markets await for the firms that are able to develop and produce new technologies that generate renewable energy and promote energy efficiency. That provides a strong economic argument for a market-based cap on carbon, while will give American firms a powerful incentive to figure out new and better ways of cutting emissions.

What about the short run? In general, the U.S. economy — like any market economy — tends to hover at some natural level of “full employment” that is determined by fundamentals like productivity, technological change, and the size of the labor force. This suggests that the main effect of a price on carbon will not be to change the overall level of employment, but to shift labor (and other resources like capital) away from carbon-intensive sectors and into cleaner sectors. Some sectors win, some sectors lose, but the overall level of employment stays the same.

The key problem with this logic is that we are clearly not in a period of “full employment.” Even though the economy seems to be slowly emerging from the recession, unemployment is still very high. And there is capital sitting on the sidelines as well, held back not only by the recent crisis but also by uncertainty over the strength of the recovery and over the regulatory environment.

When the economy is not in full employment, the picture changes fundamentally. Instead of reallocating resources from one sector to another, a price on carbon could have a positive impact by spurring demand for investment — leading to net job creation, even in the short run.

This is precisely what the Peterson Institute’s study forecasts would happen under the American Power Act. A cap on carbon would create powerful demand for new investment in clean energy, especially in the electricity sector. The Peterson Institute study projects that annual investment in the sector in the next ten years would rise by 50% as a result of the legislation — an increase of nearly $11 billion a year. Precisely because our economy is operating below full employment, the result would be a net job increase of 203,000 jobs over the next decade, relative to the no-policy “business as usual” scenario — even taking into account the effect of higher prices on fossil fuels.  This is a small number in percentage terms, but it underscores an important point about the direction of the job impact in the short run — and contradicts claims that climate policy will slow our economic recovery.

This isn’t just theoretical. In a column in the New York Times last month, David Brooks reported that if climate legislation passed, the major electric power company FPL Group would likely invest roughly $3 billion more per year in wind and solar power. Similarly, NRG Energy would triple its new clean generation capacity. That’s the kind of investment that can produce real jobs in the short run.

I’ll have more to say about other conclusions of the Peterson Institute study in coming blog posts. In the meantime, Dave Roberts at Grist has a great take on it along with a summary of the key findings.

UPDATE

I revised this post on 5/27/2010 to correct some potentially confusing language on my part (and to make a few other edits for style and exposition in the process). The Peterson study estimates that the American Power Act would increase average annual employment by 203,000 jobs over the next decade (2011-2020). In other words, according to their analysis, there will be about 200,000 more jobs in each year. My original post said “203,000 jobs per year,” which could be read to suggest that there would be an additional 203,000 jobs added to the economy each year, for a total of 2 million jobs over ten years; that is not what the study finds, and I have revised the post to clarify that point. Meanwhile, for consistency, I also revised the post to cite estimates of investment for the same period (2011-2020) rather than over the whole duration of the study (2011-2030).

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The Latest on the Climate and Clean Energy Bill

Grist has a piece by Nathaniel Keohane, Director of Economic Policy and Analysis at the Environmental Defense Fund, on how the America Power Act will return the vast majority of the emission allowance value to consumers and the public, even though some of the allowances will be distributed for free. Nathaniel acknowledges that

“some progressives worry that free allocation is at odds with cutting emissions.  After all, if you give emitters something for free, doesn’t that eliminate the “price on carbon” that creates an economic incentive to cut carbon emissions?  The answer, actually, is ‘no.'”

He explains that

“the value of allowances doesn’t depend on how they are allocated.  Rather, allowances have value because they are in scarce supply — thanks to the cap on emissions.  The tighter is the cap, the greater is the scarcity, and the higher is the value of allowances, all else equal. “

Also on Grist, David Roberts gives a great summary of the new economic study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics which details the effects of the American Power Act.

Here is one key highlight:

“Employment Effects: The Act prompts $41.1 billion in annual electricity sector investment between 2011 and 2030, $22.5 billion more than under business-as-usual. This stimulates U.S. economic growth and job creation in the first decade, increasing average annual employment by about 200,000 jobs.”

Nathaniel Keohane also weighs in on the Peterson Institute report on the Huffington Post. He starts off by explaining how:

“Opponents of climate legislation often claim that now is the wrong time to put a price on carbon, with the economy just emerging from a recession. But a must-read study released yesterday by the well-respected, nonpartisan Peterson Institute for International Economics shows that the reverse is actually true: passing climate legislation would provide the economy with a much-needed shot in the arm.”

Treehugger reports on the carbon tax enacted by Montgomery Country, Maryland.

“Not waiting for national legislation to set a price on carbon and kick start the journey to a low-carbon future, Montgomery County, Maryland has enacted one the country’s first carbon taxes. Passed by a vote of 8-to-1 the tax applies to stationary emitters of CO2 releasing more than one million tons annually into the atmosphere.”

On E2, Nancy Pelosi is urging Congress to act on climate legislation.

“Asked if she wants the Obama administration to address climate change through regulations if Congress fails to pass a bill this year, Pelosi responded, ‘It has to be done by statute.'”

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The case for strong climate policy is simple. A cap on carbon pollution is too.

Edward L. Glaeser makes the case for simplicity in addressing climate change. I couldn’t agree more with his premise. The basic economics are indeed simple. Climate change might be the largest market failure the world has ever seen. To correct it, put the right incentives in place: correct the fact that we currently treat the atmosphere as a free sewer for our global warming pollution. Problem solved.

The how and especially the politics are not quite as straight-forward. Glaeser bemoans that the proposed American Power Act has 987 pages and identifies three culprits: that the Act tries to do more than just put a price on carbon, that it uses a cap-and-trade system rather than a tax, and that the problem has an important international dimension. He is broadly right on one and three but not on two: the issue of a cap versus a tax.

A firm limit on global warming pollution does not make the law more complicated. It makes it better.

First, a cap sets a firm upper limit on pollution. Glaeser acknowledges as much by saying that “fixing the number of permits may actually be the right thing to do.” It is.

Second, it’s politics, stupid. There is a good reason why the U.S. tax code has 17,000 pages. Proposing a tax on paper is simple. Getting it through the political process is a different matter altogether. Most significantly, every tax credit, every exemption means an increase in pollution. That’s not the case with a cap. While politics does what politics does best—worry about the allocation of allowances—the upper pollution limit stands.

Third, and contrary to what is sometimes argued by tax advocates, a cap creates a more stable policy environment. Certainty is the sine qua non for energy policy.  While it is true that a cap and trade program can introduce short-term variability into the carbon price, that is unlikely to matter for investments in energy infrastructure.  What matters is certainty over the long run. Capital-intensive investment decisions take years if not decades to pay for themselves (think about a new electric power station).

A well designed cap—especially one with a price floor, which this Act would include—creates this kind of certainty, by guaranteeing that emissions must go down and, therefore, that emissions reductions will have value. A tax is easily revoked, altered, or put “on holiday.” A cap has durability. And even if it does have to be amended, market foresight will allow smooth transitions, much more so than a tax would.

Fourth is the international dimension, Glaeser’s last point. A cap makes international coordination easier. It also creates incentives for developing countries to cap their own emissions, in order to gain from selling allowances into a U.S. market and create win-win-win situations for themselves, U.S. companies and consumers, and the atmosphere.

All four of these reasons also appear in America’s Climate Choices, a terrific new study just released by the National Academy of Sciences. It provides the scientific closing argument for the debate unfolding in the Senate. The science is compelling, the urgency to act is clear, and the main solution is equally apparent: put a price on global warming pollution, ideally through a firm, declining cap on emissions.

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Why the American Power Act is Not a Corporate Give-Away

In his insightful post, Rob Stavins makes two key points regarding the allocation of emission allowances under climate legislation like that introduced last week by Senators Kerry and Lieberman.

First, Stavins addresses head-on the concerns that some progressives have toward the allocation provisions in the bill, asking in the title of his post: “Is the Kerry-Lieberman Allowance Allocation a Corporate Give-Away?”  To answer this question, Stavins carries out a careful breakdown of the allowance allocation in the Kerry-Lieberman bill.  He shows that the vast majority of emission allowances (more than 80% over the duration of the bill) — goes to energy consumers and public purposes (including deficit reduction).  That hardly sounds like a windfall to big corporations!  Indeed, if you add it up, the largest fraction of allowance value (43% in total, according to my calculations) goes to households, through an energy refund to low-income consumers, a tax credit to working families, a universal trust fund for all Americans, and allowances that are allocated to local electricity and gas utilities for the benefit of their customers.

As Stavins’s calculations illustrate, what matters most in terms of allocation is not whether the allowances are auctioned or given away for free, but who receives the value.  (For example, of the allowance value that is directed to households, about four-fifths comes as auction revenue, while the remainder is from the allowances allocated for free to local utilities.)

Even so, some progressives worry that free allocation is at odds with cutting emissions.  After all, if you give emitters something for free, doesn’t that eliminate the “price on carbon” that creates an economic incentive to cut carbon emissions?  The answer, actually, is “no.”

Here’s where Stavins’s second point comes in.  As he explains, it is a basic result of economics that even when allowances are distributed for free, they will still have a value (since they can be sold on a market). In economic terms, each time a company uses an allowance, there is an “opportunity cost” involved — the foregone profit they could have gotten from selling the allowance instead.  As a result, companies will still have a strong economic incentive to find cost-effective ways to reduce their carbon emissions — so that the economic performance of the bill is basically unaffected.  (It’s also worth pointing out that the environmental performance of the bill is also unaffected, since that is determined by the cap — not by how allowances are allocated.)

To put the same point a bit differently, the value of allowances doesn’t depend on how they are allocated.  Rather, allowances have value because they are in scarce supply — thanks to the cap on emissions.  The tighter is the cap, the greater is the scarcity, and the higher is the value of allowances, all else equal.

Of course, there are a few nuances worth noting.  First, from a strictly economic point of view, the best use of allowance value would be to use it to lower distortionary taxes on labor and capital, giving the overall economy an added boost.  However, getting such a “double dividend” requires not just auctioning the allowances, but using the revenue in a specific way to cut other taxes — something that has yet to generate significant political momentum.  In other words, acknowledging the possibility of a double dividend doesn’t undermine the main point that what matters is how the value of allowances is allocated, not simply whether allowances are auctioned or freely allocated.

Second, some ways of allocating allowances can affect incentives.  This can cut both ways.  In theory, using allowance value to reduce electricity rates can undermine incentives to conserve energy; this suggests that it would be preferable to compensate households for higher energy costs by sending them a lump-sum rebate rather than cutting their marginal price.  In other contexts, allowance allocation is deliberately designed to affect incentives.  For example, energy-intensive, trade-exposed manufacturers are given allocations that are tied to their output and to the average emissions intensity of their sector.  As research by Carolyn Fischer at Resources for the Future and others has shown, such “output-based rebates” manage to preserve the incentive to reduce emissions, while helping to keep manufacturing in this country and prevent “emissions leakage” to countries without a carbon price.

The bottom line is that the distinction between free allocation and auction makes little difference for the environmental or economic performance of the bill.  That’s a key point well worth keeping in mind in the coming debates over climate legislation.

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