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  • Blogging the science and policy of global warming

    Corona de San Carlos section of East Los Colorados Archipelago marine protected area (MPA), off the coast of Cuba Shot by Yoel De la Paz / Creative Wild Captures

    The voluntary carbon market debate we’re having is wrong

    Posted: in News

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    For several years now, one question has dominated the technical debate over voluntary carbon markets: should host countries be required to apply “corresponding adjustments” — accounting entries that prevent the same emission reduction from being counted twice — when their carbon credits are purchased by foreign companies? 

    The question sounds like a dry accounting matter. It is not. Depending on how it is answered, the result could be either a more credible voluntary carbon market or a smaller and less effective one — with the costs falling disproportionately on the countries and projects that need climate finance most. A new EDF paper, Corresponding Adjustments and the Voluntary Carbon Market makes the case that the debate, as currently framed, is asking the wrong question. 

    What corresponding adjustments are — and where they apply

    A corresponding adjustment is an accounting entry applied to a host country’s national emission balance when it transfers a mitigation outcome internationally. The logic is simple: If a country sells reductions to a foreign buyer, it should not also count those reductions toward its own Paris Agreement commitment. The same tonne of CO₂ cannot discharge two obligations simultaneously. 

    This accounting obligation is legally clear in two contexts. Under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, CAs are required for government-to-government transfers of mitigation outcomes. Under CORSIA, the international aviation offsetting scheme, CAs are required when airlines use credits to discharge their compliance obligations. Both cases involve legal obligations being discharged through the same transaction — which is precisely why double-counting matters. 

    The contested question is different: Should CAs also be required for purely voluntary transactions, where a company purchases credits to support its own net zero commitment, not to satisfy any legal obligation? 

    Two questions that keep getting conflated

    The CA debate suffers from a persistent failure to distinguish between two fundamentally different questions. 

    1. The accounting question: Are CAs legally required for voluntary corporate transactions under the Paris Agreement? The answer is no. The Paris Agreement and its implementing decisions are entirely silent on what corporate climate claims may or may not be made on the basis of carbon credits. The leap from “sovereign accounting requires CAs for government-to-government transfers” to “corporate offsetting claims require CA-backed credits” is a normative position, not a treaty requirement. 
    1. The policy effectiveness question: Would mandating CAs for voluntary transactions, in practice, produce better climate outcomes? This is an empirical question — and the honest answer is that we do not yet have the evidence to resolve it. 

    Conflating these two questions has consequences. When CAs are treated as a matter of accounting integrity, those who oppose them are forced to defend double-counting. When they are treated as a policy instrument with costs and benefits, the burden shifts to proponents to demonstrate that the benefits outweigh the costs. The second framing is the correct one. 

    Do CAs improve climate outcomes?

    Whether mandating CAs would strengthen or weaken global climate outcomes depends on three empirical parameters that remain poorly understood. 

    • Host country responsiveness: If countries systematically reduce their own domestic climate ambition when private carbon finance flows in — substituting international private money for domestic public commitment — then even additional project-level credits generate no net global benefit. This is the displacement concern at the heart of the pro-CA argument. It is a legitimate concern. But the evidence for it, across the heterogeneous landscape of VCM host countries, does not yet exist at the scale needed to justify a blanket policy response. 
    • Supply sensitivity: World Bank modelling suggests that CA-related fees could exceed $25 per tonne of CO₂ in many host countries — enough to render the most finance-dependent, highest-additionality projects unviable. For projects where carbon revenues are the margin between proceeding and not, this is not a marginal cost. The authorization infrastructure needed to implement CAs efficiently is also, as of today, absent in most potential host countries. Mandating CAs before that infrastructure exists would not reform the market — it would freeze it. 
    • Buyer differentiation: The pro-CA position assumes that CA backing is what makes corporate claims credible. But neither the ICVCM’s Core Carbon Principles, the VCMI’s Claims Code of Practice, nor the SBTi’s framework for beyond-value-chain mitigation currently requires CA backing for valid corporate claims. If buyers and the public do not, in practice, distinguish meaningfully between CA-backed and non-CA credits when the underlying quality is high, the market case for mandating CAs weakens considerably. 

    Who pays when we get CA requirements wrong?

    The cost structure of CA requirements is not neutral. The most additional projects — those entirely dependent on carbon revenue to proceed — face the steepest barriers from authorization fees. Low-additionality projects, which would happen regardless of carbon finance, are comparatively unaffected. A policy designed to protect environmental integrity should not systematically penalize the most genuinely additional activities. 

    The geographic pattern is similarly concerning. The countries with the greatest mitigation potential and the greatest need for climate finance are typically those with the least authorization infrastructure. The CDM precedent is instructive: Administrative requirements contributed to a heavy concentration of activity in a small number of large, institutionally sophisticated economies, with relatively little reaching least-developed countries. There is no reason to assume CA requirements would produce a different distribution. 

    A better path forward

    None of this is an argument for the status quo. The voluntary carbon market has serious integrity problems that rigorous governance must address. And corresponding adjustments, properly implemented, have a legitimate role in the long-term architecture of Article 6. 

    The paper proposes a conditional and progressive approach. In the near term, the priority should be rigorous enforcement of the two foundations that actually determine claim integrity: credible, science-based mitigation commitments by corporate buyers, and use of genuinely additional, high-quality credits. When both conditions are met, the case for additionally requiring CA backing is weak and the cost is real. As authorization infrastructure develops in more host countries, and as the empirical picture on displacement becomes clearer, differentiated CA requirements can be introduced where the evidence warrants them. 

    This is not a permanent exemption. It is a calibrated response to the current state of knowledge — and an honest acknowledgment that the three empirical parameters this debate turns on are resolvable, if we invest in resolving them. 

    The evidence needed to answer the CA question properly is gatherable. The displacement question can be investigated through surveys of host country policymakers and cross-country analysis of VCM inflows and NDC ambition. Supply sensitivity can be quantified through project-level analysis of authorization costs. Buyer differentiation can be measured. What the voluntary carbon market cannot afford is to substitute accounting principle for empirical rigor — and pay the cost in the countries and projects that can least absorb it.