{"id":5441,"date":"2016-07-15T09:19:15","date_gmt":"2016-07-15T14:19:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.edf.org\/health\/?p=5441"},"modified":"2024-02-12T11:01:51","modified_gmt":"2024-02-12T16:01:51","slug":"we-appear-to-have-gotten-lucky-in-the-january-2014-west-virginia-chemical-spill","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.edf.org\/health\/2016\/07\/15\/we-appear-to-have-gotten-lucky-in-the-january-2014-west-virginia-chemical-spill\/","title":{"rendered":"We appear to have gotten lucky in the January 2014 West Virginia chemical spill"},"content":{"rendered":"

Richard Denison, Ph.D.,\u00a0<\/em>is a Lead Senior Scientist.<\/p>\n

[UPDATE: \u00a0Please see additions\u00a0below. \u00a0On reflection, my “got lucky” theme here\u00a0may well have been a poor choice, as I certainly did not mean to imply that the spill was anything other than a nightmare for affected residents; rather, it was my attempt to again highlight the extent to which officials were flying blind at the time due to numerous systemic failures. \u00a0While the NTP study I discuss here answers some questions and I believe is cause for some relief, it did not address all concerns, leaves considerable\u00a0uncertainty, and doesn’t begin to undo the damage of this incident and its continuing aftermath. \u00a0Apologies to anyone who took my phrase to imply otherwise.]<\/em><\/p>\n

Readers may recall that I blogged extensively <\/a>about the January 2014 spill of chemicals into the Elk River near Charleston from tanks used to store the chemical near the river\u2019s edge, which disrupted the drinking water supply and the lives of 300,000 residents for many weeks thereafter.<\/p>\n

A key concern was the dearth of health data \u2013 both publicly available and otherwise \u2013 on the key chemical components of the spilled mixture, which was used to wash coal.\u00a0 As I reported in a series of blog posts, despite scant data, federal and state officials rushed to establish \u2013 and then defend their establishment of \u2013 a concentration of one part per million (1 ppm) as the \u201csafe\u201d level of the main component, 4-methylcyclohexanemethanol (MCHM), of the spilled mixture.\u00a0 I pointed to the lack of a scientific basis for that level, largely because of the lack of adequate health information.<\/p>\n

That remained the case even after the chemical\u2019s producer, Eastman Chemical, decided to make public its studies of the chemical that it had hidden, claiming them to constitute trade secrets.\u00a0 I tried to be careful not to claim MCHM or other spilled chemicals posed health risks, but rather that the lack of safety data was highly concerning, given the widespread extent of exposure.<\/p>\n

Among the many outcomes of the spill was an agreement by the National Toxicology Program (NTP) to undertake a thorough study of the potential health and environmental effects of MCHM and other component chemicals.\u00a0 That study is now complete<\/a>, and the results were released last week<\/a>. \u00a0<\/p>\n

The good news is that the public [see updates to this post]<\/em>\u00a0\u2013 and those federal and state officials \u2013 appear to have gotten lucky:\u00a0 NTP found no evidence of adverse effects of the chemicals at the doses to which people were exposed \u2013 although some effects were seen at significantly higher doses.\u00a0 NTP noted that effects were not seen at or below the 1 ppm level.<\/p>\n

[UPDATE: \u00a0I should clarify that the NTP study did NOT address all concerns or potential exposures; it did not look, for example, at inhalation exposures, which were of concern especially during the “flushing” procedures residents were urged to follow as well as during activities such as showering; some analyses found that such exposures may have exceeded levels recommended in federal guidance; see here <\/a>and here<\/a>. \u00a0Considerable uncertainty remains about the actual levels of exposure people experienced, as very limited exposure information was collected. \u00a0An article by\u00a0Ken Ward <\/a>in the <\/em>Charleston Gazette\u00a0details some of the remaining concerns and still-unanswered questions.]<\/em><\/p>\n

Lest anyone rush to conclude that the officials setting that level \u201cgot it right,\u201d as opposed to getting lucky, NTP\u2019s final report notes (emphasis added):<\/p>\n

At the time of the spill, there were few toxicological studies available on which to base a drinking water screening level. The lack of any studies in developing animals and humans was a concern<\/em><\/strong>, because developing organisms are typically considered more susceptible than adults to the toxic effects of environmental chemicals. There was also concern about the absence of information on many chemicals that were minor components of the spill.<\/p>\n

Upon completion of its study, NTP concluded:<\/p>\n

The NTP studies increased our knowledge about the toxicity of MCHM and other spilled chemicals. The results from the NTP studies reduced uncertainty about the information used to develop the drinking water screening levels.<\/p>\n

That\u2019s good news, though it took a concerted federal effort and millions of dollars to get to this conclusion \u2013 all long after the spill occurred.<\/p>\n

As I noted in my blogging, MCHM is no isolated incident:\u00a0 Many, if not most, chemicals in widespread use lack adequate safety data.\u00a0 A large part of the blame <\/a>is attributable to the ineffective Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976, which tied EPA\u2019s hands when it came to requiring testing and provided no mandate for EPA to review the safety of chemicals in commerce.<\/p>\n

Happily, change is underway:\u00a0 I suspect all of my readers know that TSCA has now been updated<\/a> and among the changes are several that bear on chemicals like MCHM, including these features of the new law:<\/p>\n