{"id":3031,"date":"2014-02-09T17:16:56","date_gmt":"2014-02-09T22:16:56","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.edf.org\/health\/?p=3031"},"modified":"2024-02-12T11:01:34","modified_gmt":"2024-02-12T16:01:34","slug":"a-full-month-after-west-virginia-spill-many-questions-linger-along-with-the-chemicals-distinctive-odor","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.edf.org\/health\/2014\/02\/09\/a-full-month-after-west-virginia-spill-many-questions-linger-along-with-the-chemicals-distinctive-odor\/","title":{"rendered":"A full month after West Virginia spill, many questions linger … along with the chemical\u2019s distinctive odor"},"content":{"rendered":"

Richard Denison, Ph.D.<\/em>,<\/em> is a Senior Scientist.<\/p>\n

Today marks exactly a month since what is now said to be 10,000 gallons of \u201ccrude MCHM\u201d \u2013 mixed with what was later found to have included other chemicals \u2013 spilled into West Virginia\u2019s Elk River, contaminated 1,700 miles of piping in the water distribution system for nine counties, and disrupted the lives of hundreds of thousands of the state\u2019s residents.\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Despite declining levels of the chemical in the water being fed into the distribution system, late this past week five area schools were closed due to detection of the distinctive licorice-like odor of MCHM and multiple reports of symptoms such as eye irritation, nausea and dizziness among students and staff.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

The <\/span>latest sampling data<\/span><\/a> (for February 7 and 8) at locations such as area fire hydrants and hospitals and at schools shows that MCHM is at non-detect levels (<10 parts per billion) in most samples, but the chemical is still being detected in a minority of the samples despite extensive flushing.\u00a0 Despite repeated calls to do so, officials appear to have yet to conduct any sampling of taps in residents\u2019 homes.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

This past week also featured a press conference by state and federal officials seeking to explain their response to the spill (a video of the entire press conference is <\/span>available in four parts here<\/span><\/a>; it\u2019s worth watching).\u00a0 [UPDATE 3\/29\/14:\u00a0 As this link no longer works, here are updated links to Part 1<\/a>, Part 2<\/a>, Part 3<\/a> and Part 4<\/a> of the press conference.]<\/em><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Today\u2019s Charleston Gazette<\/i><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> features the latest in a long series of outstanding front-line reports by Ken Ward, Jr., and his colleagues, who have closely followed every twist and turn of both the spill and the government\u2019s response to it.\u00a0 Today\u2019s article makes clear the extent to which federal officials were winging it in the hours and days after the spill was discovered as they rushed to set a \u201csafe\u201d level for MCHM in tap water.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

In this post I\u2019ll delve a little deeper into CDC\u2019s rush to set the \u201csafe\u201d level and the many ways in which CDC inadequately accounted for major data gaps and uncertainties.\u00a0 I\u2019ll end by saying what I think CDC should have done instead.\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

CDC\u2019s rush to set a \u201csafe\u201d level<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

On full display in last week\u2019s press conference was CDC\u2019s remarkable effort to claim that every new data point and every new source of uncertainty that have arisen since it set what Ken Ward calls the \u201cmagic number\u201d of 1 part per million (1 ppm) had already been taken into account.\u00a0\u00a0 The Charleston Gazette<\/i> piece today makes clear that this \u201csafe\u201d level was first derived by CDC late in the evening of January 9, the day the spill was first discovered.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Bear in mind CDC set the 1 ppm level:<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/p>\n