Richard Denison, Ph.D., is a Senior Scientist.
Since my first post concerning EPA’s Consent Order, I’ve been reflecting further on the management conditions it imposes – or, more accurately, on what conditions it doesn’t impose. The Order’s only such conditions address potential worker exposure. What about the rest of the nanomaterial’s lifecycle? Read More
Richard Denison, Ph.D., is a Senior Scientist.
[Part II of this post is available here.]
Word hit the street today that EPA intends to make public a “sanitized” version of a Consent Order it has negotiated with a producer of multiwalled carbon nanotubes (MWCNTs). [A link will be provided once available.] We obtained a copy of the Order, which has redacted all information claimed confidential by the company involved. What can we learn from this well-scrubbed Order? Read More
Cal Baier-Anderson, Ph.D., is a Health Scientist.
I have just finished reading yet another depressing/infuriating publication by the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies. The new report delineates the many limitations faced by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) in addressing nanotechnology health risks. The law governing the CPSC has significant weaknesses that prevent it from meeting critical needs, such as constraints on the ability to collect data, require reporting of known hazards, order recalls and promulgate mandatory safety standards.
Richard Denison, Ph.D., is a Senior Scientist.
A growing number of observers of nanotechnology policy in the U.S. – at least those outside the U.S. government! – recognize that the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) is poorly suited both to spur the generation of sufficient information about nanomaterials, and to ensure that information indicating potential risks will trigger meaningful action. So why not just tweak TSCA to make it work better for nano? Read More
Richard Denison, Ph.D., is a Senior Scientist.
As I noted in an earlier post, the federal government staunchly maintains that regulatory agencies’ current authorities and regulatory structures are adequate. Yet I sense quite a bit of angst — even panic — in the agencies over how they will actually address the complexities of nanotechnology under those existing authorities and regulatory structures.
The claim that laws developed long before nanotechnology came along can nevertheless manage it flawlessly smacks of a double standard: If there’s nothing novel here, why is the federal government investing $1.5 billion annually to develop nanotechnology? Read More
