

**STATE OF ILLINOIS
ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION**

THE CITIZENS UTILITY BOARD)	
and)	
THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND)	
)	Docket No. 15-_____
Proceeding to Investigate Adoption of a)	
Utility Time of Use Tariff)	

CUB/EDF Exhibit 1.0

Direct Testimony of Dr. James Fine

February 5, 2015

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6

7 **INTRODUCTION**

8 **Q. Please state your name and business.**

9 A. My name is James Fine. My business address is Environmental Defense Fund, 123
10 Mission Street, 28th Floor, San Francisco, California 94105.

11 **Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

12 A. I am employed as Director of Energy Research and Senior Economist, Clean Energy
13 Program by the Environmental Defense Fund (“EDF”).

14 **Q. Please describe your educational background and work experience.**

15 A. I received my B.S. in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania Wharton School in
16 1989, and my Ph.D. from the University of California Berkeley, Energy and Resources
17 Group, in 2003. I have over 20 years of experience working in the fields of
18 environmental and energy economics, with over the last three years spent primarily on
19 clean energy issues. I consulted with M.Cubed and Envair from 1994 to 2007 and was an
20 assistant and adjunct professor at the University of San Francisco. Since 2009, I have
21 worked closely with the California Public Utilities Commission and with the California
22 investor-owned utilities on many clean energy issues, including residential rate reforms
23 focusing on time-variant tariffs, long term resource planning, demand response,

24 renewable energy, on-bill repayment and smart grid deployment. I serve as lead
25 economist in EDF's Clean Energy Program. Please see Exhibit 1.1 for my resume.

26 **Q. What are your responsibilities as Director of Energy Research and Senior**
27 **Economist at EDF's Clean Energy Program?**

28 A. I am responsible for developing and supporting policies that appropriately value energy
29 goods and services. EDF's clean energy program is endeavoring to spur industry
30 paradigm change in pursuit of decarbonizing the electricity sector. Strategies include
31 optimizing the electric grid's performance, rewarding customers for the full value of
32 clean energy, and unleashing the potential of private capital.

33 **Q. On whose behalf are you testifying today?**

34 A. I'm testifying on behalf of the Citizens Utility Board ("CUB") and EDF.

35 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

36 A. I believe that Illinois electric utilities participating in the Energy Infrastructure
37 Modernization Act ("EIMA") should offer residential customers an optional Time of Use
38 ("TOU") rate tariff. A TOU rate, designed and deployed as I recommend here, can
39 reduce costs to the grid, create jobs, lower energy costs for customers, and help Illinois
40 achieve EIMA goals. A TOU rate can also help improve load shape, conserve energy,
41 and move utilities closer to meeting goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
42 ("GHGs"). As explained below, the value of a TOU rate is well substantiated. However,
43 the design of TOU rates, along with a well-executed customer education and engagement
44 campaign, is crucial to the adoption and success of the rate. Put differently, deployment
45 is as critical to success as initial TOU rate design.

46 **Q. What are you recommending the Illinois Commerce Commission do?**

47 A. I recommend the Illinois Commerce Commission (“Commission” or “ICC”) initiate an
48 investigation into how a TOU rate can be designed and implemented, consistent with the
49 best practices described herein. Following this investigation, the Commission should
50 direct EIMA participating utilities to file tariffs implementing a TOU rate on an opt-in
51 basis as a pilot program. The success of the TOU rate should be, consistent with prior
52 Illinois practice in testing new rate designs, reviewed after four years. If the Commission
53 concludes that a TOU rate has benefits for Illinois customers, the Commission should
54 then make the TOU rate offering a permanent addition to the existing rates offered by
55 Illinois utilities, Commonwealth Edison Company (“ComEd”) and the Ameren Illinois
56 Company (“Ameren”), the two utilities I understand are participating in the EIMA.

57 **Q. How is your testimony organized?**

58 A. My testimony is broadly organized to address the following: 1) the benefits a TOU rate
59 can provide to consumers, the environment, and the overall functioning of the electric
60 grid; 2) recommended design elements that should be considered by the utilities in
61 crafting a TOU rate; and 3) recommendations related to TOU rate implementation and
62 deployment in Illinois.

63 **Q. Do you have any exhibit attachments to your testimony?**

64 A. Yes, I have two exhibit attachments to my direct testimony,
65 • CUB/EDF Exhibit 1.1, Resume of Dr. James Fine, which describes my work with
66 EDF and past experience with the design and implementation of dynamic pricing
67 programs, including TOU rates.


- 68 • CUB/EDF Exhibit 1.2, TOU Cost Savings Estimates for California and New York,
69 which summarizes research done by EDF in respect to TOU pilots and potential
70 benefits by utilities in those states.

71

72 **I. THE VALUE OF TIME-OF-USE RATES FOR ILLINOIS**

73 **Q. Please explain what a TOU rate is and how it works?**

74 A. In its simplest form, a TOU rate is one which charges a different price for electricity used
75 at different times of day. A TOU rate recognizes the financial and societal costs of
76 producing electricity are not constant but vary in predictable patterns. Wholesale
77 electricity prices rise and fall based on supply and demand. A TOU rate transparently
78 provides this information to consumers. While the specific design of a TOU pricing
79 structure can vary, it typically divides the day into blocks of time, including on-peak
80 hours (when electricity is more costly to produce, typically in the afternoon), off-peak
81 hours (when electricity is less costly to produce, typically in the morning and evening),
82 and super off-peak (when electricity is even less costly to produce). A TOU then prices
83 electricity accordingly, with rates being higher during on-peak periods than in off-peak
84 periods, and lowest in super off-peak periods. Such time blocks and prices can be
85 adjusted regularly in order to reflect demand changes within the evolving grid, yet on-
86 peak, off-peak, and super off-peak periods and prices should remain relatively stable over
87 time so customers can become familiar with them and shift their electricity usage patterns
88 from on-peak hours to the less expensive off-peak hours. The graphic below illustrates
89 the general aspects of a TOU, and shows how it differs from Critical Peak Pricing
90 (“CPP”) and Peak Time Rebates (“PTR”).



91

92 **Q. How does a TOU rate compare to how customers are charged today?**

93 A. Typically, Ameren and Com Ed charge customers a “flat rate.” That is, the customer
 94 pays the same price for using a kilowatt-hour (“kWh”) at any time of the day, regardless

95 of the cost to produce that power. Unlike a TOU rate (or any variant rate), a flat-rate
96 structure inhibits a customer's ability to manage her electricity consumption and bill.
97 Under a flat-rate structure, individuals wanting to lower their electricity bill have only
98 two options: they can either (a) self-generate their own electricity, or (b) reduce their
99 consumption by investing in more efficient appliances. The typical flat rate structure
100 leads to unnecessary costs. A well-known 2012 meta-analysis published by the Brattle
101 Group examined over 126 different pricing treatments in over 60 time-variant rate
102 programs.¹ This study found that customers can and do respond to time-variant rate
103 programs, and that responses can be enhanced enabling technologies. Another study by
104 Brattle Group found that "each year American consumers are paying \$7 billion more for
105 electricity on flat rate pricing than they would be paying on time-variant rates."²

106 **Q. How does TOU rate compare to an hourly pricing structure?**

107 A. Under a TOU rate, consumers enjoy an extra method to reduce electricity bills: shifting
108 electricity use to less expensive times. Put another way, TOUs enable households to shift
109 between peak, off-peak, and super off-peak times, thereby reducing their monthly bills.³

110 **Q. How do customers' electricity usage patterns change when they participate in a**
111 **TOU rate program?**

112 A. TOU rates have demonstrated in real-world applications that consumer demand for
113 electricity is affected by price changes.⁴ Customers can and do avoid higher prices

¹ Ahmad Faruqui and Jenny Palmer, *The Discovery of Price Responsiveness – A Survey of Experiments Involving Dynamic Pricing of Electricity*. EDI Quarterly, March 12, 2012.

² Ahmad Faruqui, Ryan Hledik, and Neil Lessem, *Smart by Default; Time-Varying Rates From The Get-Go -- Not Just By Opt-In*. PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, August, 2014.

³ P. Fox-Penner, *Smart Power: Climate Change, the Smart Grid, and the Future of Electric Utilities* 43 (2010); Herter Energy Res. Solutions, *SMUD's Residential Summer Solution* 4-5(Feb. 2012).

114 because electricity demand is elastic. This avoidance of high-priced electricity is what
115 economists refer to as substitution. One example of such substitution would be a
116 customer shifting his/her electricity demand to lower-priced times of day. Another would
117 be a consumer investing in energy conservation and/or self-generation. All such actions
118 tend to reduce energy use at times of peak prices. Dozens of electricity pricing studies
119 have measured how price (and other factors) influences substitution elasticities.⁵ It is
120 possible to predict with a high level of confidence how much demand will change in
121 response to a change in the peak and off-peak electricity prices, assuming the presence of
122 other critical components, such as effective marketing and customer outreach.

123 **Q. Has price substitution been observed in real world studies?**

124 A. Yes. Pilot studies show that customers use electricity at lower-cost times of the day, and
125 will invest in conservation and self-generation when the economics of doing so are
126 favorable and obvious. As a result, the cost and energy savings from broad adoption of
127 TOU rates are potentially substantial. A widely-cited 2005 study entitled *Impact*
128 *Evaluation of the California Statewide Pricing Pilot* involved 2,500 residential customers
129 and examined a traditional TOU rate with CPP events.⁶ This study corroborates the
130 earlier noted Brattle Group meta-analysis. As indicated in the table below, the study
131 showed a 4.7-percent usage reduction due to TOU rates and 13.1-percent usage reduction
132 during CPP events on average:

133

⁴ Ahmad Faruqui, Ryan Hledik, and Neil Lessem, *Smart by Default; Time-Varying Rates From The Get-Go -- Not Just By Opt-In*. PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, August, 2014.

⁵ See Ahmad Faruqui and Jenny Palmer, *The Discovery of Price Responsiveness – A Survey of Experiments Involving Dynamic Pricing of Electricity*. EDI Quarterly, March 12, 2012.

⁶ The study uses the term “Critical-Peak-Fixed” (CPP-F) to refer to the TOU+CPP pricing scheme.

California Statewide Pricing Pilot: Dynamic Rate Pricing Scheme⁷

Pricing Plan	Avg. Peak Price (¢/kWh)	Avg. Off-Peak Price (¢/kWh)	Avg. Daily Price (¢/kWh)	Avg. Usage Reduction
Fixed-Rate	13	13	13	--
TOU Rate (normal weekday)	22	9	12	4.7%
CPP event (critical weekday)	59	9	23	13.1%

134

135 **Q. Does Illinois have any experience with time variant rate design?**

136 A. Yes. Illinois utilities already offer customers TOU rates that fluctuate by the hour, such
137 as the residential real-time pricing rates. CUB and EDF propose a simpler version of
138 these existing hourly rates. Like hourly pricing, CUB and EDF recommend that the
139 utilities implement TOU rates which reflect temporal variations in the cost of service, but
140 with less precision than hourly rates. This would represent a compromise between flat-
141 rate and hourly pricing. It is a another step towards increasing customer familiarity with
142 variant rate design, generally, and towards increased adoption of more dynamic pricing
143 rates, such as an hourly pricing structure because customers become familiar with the
144 idea of power price volatility.

145 **Q. What are the benefits to customers of a TOU rate?**

146 A. A well-designed and effectively implemented TOU rate would provide at least five
147 concrete benefits to Illinois ratepayers.

⁷ *Impact Evaluation of the California Statewide Pricing Pilot* (Charles River Associates International, March 2005), 11–7, https://www.smartgrid.gov/document/impact_evaluation_california_statewide_pricing_pilot.

- 148 1. By providing to consumers information that ties the cost of service to the timing
149 of energy use, TOU rates give customers the opportunity to reduce their energy
150 bills by using electricity when it is less costly.
- 151 2. System costs will be allocated more accurately and thus equitably to those who
152 cause costs. As I explain in more detail in Section III below, utility distribution
153 systems are built to meet the coincident system-wide peak demand. In a flat-rate
154 pricing structure, those customers who contribute more than the average customer
155 to peak demand are in effect being subsidized by those customers who do not.
- 156 3. TOU rates should reduce energy use at times of peak system cost, affecting a
157 beneficial flattening of the load curve. A flatter load curve means that a
158 customer's energy supplier needs to purchase less high-priced peak energy, as
159 well as avoid the need to build more power-generation capacity to meet
160 contingency reserves. In turn, higher capacity factors at existing generating plants
161 means improved cost-effectiveness.
- 162 4. A reduction in system peak offers environmental benefit as less "peaker"
163 generation plants, which tend to be the highest polluting units, are needed to serve
164 customers who shift their use to off-peak periods. As less energy is transmitted
165 during the peak periods, less is lost in transmission, and overall system energy
166 efficiency is improved while pollution is reduced.
- 167 5. By signaling to customers when to use, and when to avoid using, electricity, TOU
168 rates reduce the need for ramping resources and, therefore, increase the grid's
169 ability to integrate greater quantities of variable renewable energy.

170 **Q. Are these benefits limited to only those customer who choose to adopt a TOU rate?**

171 A. No. The broad adoption of a TOU rate provides substantial benefits for all customers
172 over both the short and long terms . The potential savings can be substantial. EDF's
173 analysis, detailed in Exhibit 1.2, found that if just half of the ratepayers served by
174 California's three largest investor-owned utilities adopted TOU rates, thirty three 100-
175 megawatt ("MW") fossil fuel power plants could be avoided and total system costs would
176 be reduced \$500 million per year (approximately a 20% reduction). Likewise, under a
177 similar set of assumptions for New York residents, utility Consolidated Edison could
178 reduce its peak demand by 26 percent (650 MW), providing avoided and total system
179 cost reductions of \$190 million per year (approximately 20% reduction). Other studies
180 also suggest TOU rates benefit diverse consumers. Brattle Group studies, for instance,

181 have found TOU rate benefits extend to low-income consumers, findings that support
182 broad adoption of TOU rates for residential customers.⁸

183 **Q. What is the potential to avoid system costs if customers adopt TOU rates?**

184 A. As stated above, EDF – using conservative assumptions – has estimated system-wide cost
185 savings of approximately \$500 million per year in California and \$190 million per year
186 Consolidated Edison’s territory in New York. EDF’s estimates are confirmed by other
187 studies. A 2007 Brattle Group report, for instance, looked looking at the effects peak
188 usage reduction in five Mid-Atlantic states and found that cutting peak demand by a mere
189 three percent led to price reductions of five to eight percent and potential savings to
190 customers of \$73 million per year.⁹ Such savings represent money that otherwise would
191 be spent to build and operate expensive and polluting peak power plants and an over-
192 sized distribution system. This represents absolute savings – not costs shifted between
193 ratepayers. Studies by the Brattle Group also have found that 60 percent of time-variant
194 pricing tests have produced peak reductions of 10 percent or greater. These findings are
195 further supported by those found from California’s Statewide Pricing Pilot, where the
196 estimated average reduction in peak-period energy use on critical days was 13 percent.
197 This reduction in peak usage has system benefits: less generation from the most
198 expensive and often the most polluting sources of energy.

199 **Q. What are the environmental benefits from TOU rates?**

⁸See Ahmad Faruqui, Sanem Sergici, and Eric Shultz, *Meta-Analysis of Dynamic Pricing Studies- Some Initial Findings*, 2012 Brattle Group; see Ahmad Faruqui, et. al., *The Impact of Dynamic Pricing on Low Income Customers*, Institute for Electric Efficiency, September 2010.

http://www.edisonfoundation.net/IEE/Documents/IEE_LowIncomeDynamicPricing_0910.pdf.

⁹ Brattle Group, *Quantifying Demand Response Benefits in PJM*. PJM and MADRI, 2007.

200 A. TOU rate adoption can flatten load profiles and avoid some of the worst environmental
201 impacts of power production, particularly the use of last-in-the-supply-line peaker plants
202 that tend to run on polluting fossil fuels. TOU rates also can support larger quantities of
203 distributed generation and renewable resources. Because TOU prices reflect more
204 accurately the current cost of service, resources such as photovoltaics (“PV”)
205 compensated through net metering will be more appropriately valued and reflect higher
206 peak rates.¹⁰

207 **Q. Do TOU rates encourage overall system efficiency?**

208 A. Yes. TOU rates cause more costly electricity to be priced higher than less costly
209 electricity, thereby changing consumer behavior.¹¹ The substitution effect discussed
210 above implies that since the consumer faces a cheaper electricity price off-peak, she will
211 substitute peak demand in favor of using energy at off-peak times. This behavior carried
212 out by many consumers at once helps to flatten the system-wide coincident peak load,
213 saving the need to invest in and operate expensive and polluting peaker units. To the
214 extent there is a “rebound effect,” – increased consumption because of lower prices
215 during off-peak hours – the overall effect is likely to be non-existent or low since
216 consumers are shifting rather than increasing demand. As an example, consider that

¹⁰ One study has evaluated the impact of all residential NEM customers moving to TOU rates to find a small positive system impact relative to IBP when the current 5% NEM cap is reached, This indicates that the current TOU rate provides a smaller financial compensation to NEM customers than IBP. *See infra* FN 3.

¹¹ W. Nicholson, *Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions* 245 (7th ed. 1998) at 133.

217 consumers enjoying TOU rates may run their dishwashers at less expensive times of the
218 day, but they won't have more dirty dishes to wash.¹²

219 **Q. Can TOU rates be used in conjunction with other types of programs like critical**
220 **peak pricing and peak time rebates?**

221 A. Yes. Both CPP and PTR encourage customers to reduce usage during a small number of
222 critical peak hours when electricity demand (and price) is at its highest – typically during
223 the hottest summer days. To motivate reductions during these hours, a PTR offers
224 rebates to participating customers who reduce consumption, while CPP works in the
225 inverse, applying higher prices when electricity is most costly to produce. Because a
226 TOU rate necessarily increases customer awareness of time-variant price fluctuations, it
227 reinforces the message to respond to CPP and PTR incentives.


228 **Q. How do customers respond to TOU rates?**

229 A. Numerous pilots have shown that customers respond favorably to TOU rates. For
230 example, a 2013 study of programs at Sacramento Municipal Utility District (“SMUD”)
231 found that only four percent of opt-out customers and five to six percent of opt-in
232 customers dropped their TOU rate plans over the span of two years.¹³ Customer
233 reactions to TOU rates depend upon a variety of factors, including the price of electricity,
234 the low- and high-priced time blocks associated with the rate, and, perhaps most
235 significant, the effectiveness of outreach, marketing and technology enablement

¹² Kenneth Gillingham, Matthew J. Kotchen, David S. Rapson & Gernot Wagner, *Energy policy: The rebound effect is overplayed*, 493 *Nature* at 475-76 (2013).

¹³ Lupe R. Jimenez, et al., *SmartPricing Options Interim Evaluation: An interim evaluation of the pilot design, implementation, and evaluation of the Sacramento Municipal Utility District's Consumer Behavior Study* (Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.smartgrid.gov/sites/default/files/MASTER_SMUD%20CBS%20Interim%20Evaluation_Final_SUBMITTED%20TO%20TAG%2020131023.pdf.


236 programs. That's one reason I recommend specific best practices for implementation of a
237 TOU rate, described in more detail below. With thoughtful deployment, such as in the
238 case of the SMUD program, customer response has been found to be overwhelmingly
239 positive as summarized in the graphs below:



240

Dropout rates for opt-in participants were also low but slightly higher than for default participants

Opt-in acceptance rates were between 15% and 20% and varied little across pricing plans – this does NOT necessarily mean that CPP and TOU rates are equally preferred
Given high customer churn, it would be hard and expensive to keep enrollment constant for opt-in plans unless SMUD allowed pricing plans to follow customers



Nexant

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SMUD

241

242

243 **Q. What has been the customer reaction to the TOU rate offerings in other states?**

244 A. TOU rates have also been well received in a number of other states. More than half of
245 residential customers have voluntarily chosen such tariffs in the Arizona Public Service
246 (“APS”) and Salt River Project (“SRP”) service territories. In another example,
247 residential customers in Connecticut Light and Power’s dynamic pricing pilot reported a
248 satisfaction rate of 92 percent; commercial and industrial customers had an average
249 satisfaction rating of 4.1 out of 6, with 73.5 percent indicating they would participate
250 again. Focus groups found that consumers most liked how the program allowed them to
251 save money. Pilots at other utilities – including Consumers Energy, Baltimore Gas &
252 Electric, and Hydro One – have seen similarly high levels of satisfaction. For instance,
253 nearly 100 percent of Hydro One’s customers on a pilot TOU rate were interested in

254 returning to a dynamic pricing structure post-pilot and only 4 percent of participants
255 found changes in daily activities to be inconvenient. Closer to Illinois, in Michigan, 78
256 percent of customers in Consumers Energy's TOU pilot reported satisfaction with the
257 rate, with 92 percent reporting they were likely to participate again. In the
258 aforementioned California SMUD pricing pilot, over 75% of opt-in and over half of
259 customers defaulted to a TOU rate said they wanted to stay on that rate.

260 **Q. What can Illinois learn from its own real-time pricing efforts?**

261 A. Over the last seven years, ComEd's hourly pricing initiative, known as the Residential
262 Real-Time Pricing Program ("RRTP"), has saved 9,500 participating households \$13.7
263 million on their electric bills, or about 28 percent. Similarly, Ameren's hourly pricing
264 program, known as Power Smart Pricing, saved 13,500 participating households \$9.4
265 million, or about 26 percent.¹⁴ The success of these programs, which require more from
266 customers in terms of time and education than TOU rates, indicate Illinois could benefit
267 substantially from a TOU rate that involves the participation of many more customers.
268 The state's success with hourly pricing, moreover, suggests a TOU rate could serve as a
269 first step for customers who could, after increased familiarity with time-variant pricing,
270 eventually switch to an hourly pricing rate.

271 **Q. How can customers enhance their response to a TOU rate?**

272 A. A variety of enabling technologies, such as programmable control thermostats ("PCTs")
273 or other "smart" user-feedback devices, can enhance a customer's response to TOU rates.
274 Many technologies and smart devices are designed with the specific goal in mind of
275 enabling customers to shift their usage to off-peak times. However, if customers are not

¹⁴ Becker, David, *The Smart Grid is Coming: Why Hourly Pricing is Key*. Elevate Energy (2014).

276 able to see time-variant price fluctuations, they are unable to fully enjoy the benefits of
277 many of these technologies and are less incentivized to use them. The implementation of
278 a TOU rate greatly encourages customers to adopt these smart devices and supports their
279 development of a robust market in Illinois.

280 **Q. How do smart devices work and what are some examples?**

281 A. The range of smart devices available to customers varies greatly and is expanding as new
282 technologies and behavioral insights are developed. While specifics can vary somewhat
283 depending on the type of technology, in general smart devices are those that enable
284 customers to change the amount and/or the time of day in which their homes are using
285 electricity. The following are common smart devices but are by no means an exhaustive
286 list:

- 287 • Energy Information Displays (also known as In-home displays or “IHDs”):
288 Provide customers with real-time energy consumption updated regularly
289 (commonly in less than one-minute increments). Some in-home displays may be
290 capable of setting alerts and providing estimated price.
- 291 • Programmable communicating thermostats (“PCTs”): Allow customers to
292 program and control cooling and heating temperatures in their homes. Some
293 programmable communicating thermostats allow control of temperature settings
294 remotely (e.g., via the internet or a smartphone), and may also display usage data
295 in real-time. Some PCTs, such as the popular Nest Learning Thermostat, “learn”
296 the usage patterns and preferences of customers, and can have settings updated
297 remotely to, for example, prepare for seasonal changes in both rates and energy
298 usage needs. Likewise, some PTCs are also capable of receiving energy
299 management alerts or messages to customers.
- 300 • Plug load controllers: These devices are plugged into a standard wall outlet and
301 can measure the energy usage of a connected electrical appliance. Many load
302 controllers allow for customers to view the usage of connected appliances in real-
303 time and allow for remote control of such appliances (e.g., via the internet or a
304 smartphone).
- 305 • Gateways: Communicate with smart meters to provide electricity usage
306 information via a web portal, or through an in-home display. Multiple devices

307 can be connected to a gateway so it can transmit data to and from each connected
308 device.

309 • Smartphone applications: Many smartphone applications work in conjunction
310 many with smart devices and allow customers to view and control their electricity
311 usage.

312 **Q. How does a TOU rate affect the value proposition for investing in smart devices and**
313 **distributed energy resources?**

314 A. Given the capabilities of these and many other smart devices, a TOU rate that allows
315 customers to take advantage of time-variant pricing naturally enhances the incentive to
316 use these technologies, thereby saving electricity and money. Because TOU rates reward
317 customers for shifting their usage to lower cost times, they enhance the value proposition
318 for enabling "set-it-and-forget-it" automation technology, such as programmable
319 thermostats. TOU rates thus help integrate and complement smart devices – an objective
320 previously stated by the Commission.¹⁵ TOU rates also help to integrate other distributed
321 energy resources, such as energy efficiency, demand response, storage, solar energy, and
322 self-generation. As noted above, TOU rates can address 'ramping needs' that emerge
323 when electrical output varies predictably with some renewable resources. For example,
324 solar output regularly increases during the morning hours, decreases in the afternoon, and
325 drops during nighttime hours. To ensure the grid is able to integrate this renewable
326 energy source, which is only available during certain times, resources and technology
327 able to match supply and demand become all the more important. Any time-variant
328 tariff, inclusive of a TOU rate, would provide this function – motivating customers to use
329 electricity when it is cheap and plentiful (such as when solar power output is high). This

¹⁵ See Final Order, ICC Docket No. 13-0498, at 78-79 (Jan. 28, 2014); Final Order, ICC Docket No. 13-0498 at 80 (Jan. 28, 2014).

330 is a foreseeable issue in Illinois: the load forecasts for Spring 2016 for both ComEd and
331 Ameren show the need for significant ramping resources to serve load in the mornings
332 and evenings.¹⁶

333 **Q. Has the Commission previously considered the benefits of smart devices?**

334 A. Yes. It's my understanding that both ComEd and Ameren are currently exploring
335 programs to distribute "smart devices" to customers as part of their energy efficiency
336 programs. Like any time-variant rate, a TOU rate would complement those initiatives.
337 The Commission has recognized the benefits of smart devices in both the ComEd and
338 Ameren service territories. In its Final Order in Docket No. 13-0498 concerning the
339 adoption of Ameren's 2014-2016 Energy Efficiency and Demand Response Plan, the
340 Commission describes the benefits of smart devices and the need to maximize their
341 benefits for customers:

342 *The Commission is dedicated to providing consumers with all available tools to*
343 *take control of their energy use, maximize savings and encourage conservation.*
344 *This approach includes leveraging the investments of smart grid that are well*
345 *underway. In PY9 alone, AIC will be deploying roughly 400,000 smart meters in*
346 *its territory. At the same time, private market innovation with home devices is*
347 *moving at a rapid pace. Customers are adopting new technologies that provide*
348 *interoperability between devices so they can have greater control over their*
349 *energy needs.*

350 *Many of these devices may be unable to communicate with AIC's smart meters. It*
351 *appears that this lack of interoperability is not due to technological constraints;*
352 *rather, the roadblock appears to be a lack of standards and coordination among*
353 *AIC and manufacturers. Furthermore, customers would have no way of knowing*
354 *what devices can and cannot communicate with their smart meter.*

355 *AIC's smart meters could provide effective tools for greater energy reduction and*
356 *management if they are paired correctly with smart home devices. The*
357 *Commission believes that ELPC's smart devices program could provide a*
358 *mechanism to unlock additional savings previously unattainable if*

¹⁶ Illinois Power Agency, 2015 Electricity Procurement Plan, ICC Docket No. 14-0588, at 22 and 27 (Sept. 29, 2014).

359 *interoperability standards are developed and consumers can make choices*
360 *knowing which devices are compatible with their meters and which are not.*¹⁷

361 Similarly, in its Final Order in Docket No. 13-0495 concerning the adoption of ComEd's
362 2014-2016 Energy Efficiency and Demand Response Plan, the Commission recognized
363 the benefits of smart devices in light of the utility's large investment in Advanced
364 Metering Infrastructure ("AMI"):

365 *The Commission agrees with ELPC that nothing precludes consideration of Smart*
366 *Devices in the context of a Section 8-103 EE plan. In fact, ignoring the potential*
367 *benefits of such a program would be to deny the inherent link between AMI*
368 *deployment and the energy efficiency potential that it brings.*

369 *As ELPC points out, the Illinois Energy Infrastructure Modernization Act*
370 *requires ComEd to invest over \$2.6 billion on AMI deployment, Smart Grid*
371 *technologies, and grid modernization over the next 10 years. ComEd plans to*
372 *deploy more than 1.2 million smart meters and the associated two-way*
373 *communications by PY9 and over 4 million meters by the end of 2021. ComEd's*
374 *smart meter deployment has the potential to enable significant energy efficiency*
375 *and demand reduction by customers. The Commission believes it is important that*
376 *ComEd take steps to integrate its smart meter deployment with additional*
377 *measures that produce energy efficiency savings for customers.*¹⁸

378

379 **Q. How can a TOU rate assist the efforts of the Illinois Power Agency ("IPA") to fulfill**
380 **its mission of obtaining "adequate, reliable, affordable, efficient, and**
381 **environmentally sustainable electric service at the lowest total cost over time" for**
382 **ComEd and Ameren customers?**¹⁹

383 A. It can help by complementing efforts of the IPA to procure distributed energy resources
384 such as rooftop solar. It is my understanding that the IPA is conducting a one-time series
385 of auctions for solar renewable energy credits ("SRECs"), aimed at stimulating the

¹⁷ *In Re Ameren Illinois Company*, Final Order, ICC Docket No. 13-0498, at 78-79 (Jan. 28, 2014).

¹⁸ *In Re Commonwealth Edison Company*, Final Order, ICC Docket No. 13-0495, at 80 (Jan. 28, 2014).

¹⁹ 20 ILCS 3855/1-5.

386 rooftop solar market in Illinois. While the sale of SRECs is an important incentive for
387 potential solar investors, it is not the only method of monetizing a rooftop installation. A
388 growing number of residents and businesses also receive on-bill net metering credits for
389 periods when the amount of electricity their on-site solar installation generated exceeded
390 the amount that they used, and that excess electricity was available for the distribution
391 grid to deliver elsewhere. With a TOU rate, those customers would have the potential to
392 reap even greater rewards, as the value of the excess energy they generated would be
393 higher. This would create additional financial incentive for consumers to invest in
394 rooftop solar technology.

395 **Q. Can a TOU rate support other policy initiatives important to Illinois?**

396 A. Yes. As a demand-side resource, TOU rates can reduce greenhouse-gas (“GHG”)
397 emissions and add to compliance options for the Environmental Protection Agency’s
398 (“EPA”) proposed Clean Power Plan. According to the EPA timeline, states will be
399 required to submit plans implementing the standards in compliance with guidelines by
400 June 30, 2016. EPA officials say their framework will be flexible and accommodate the
401 successful deployment of renewable energy, distributed generation, and demand-side
402 resources, including demand response resources created by time-variant tariffs. With
403 clear foresight that new rules for GHG emissions are on the horizon, it is imperative for
404 Illinois to utilize all available cost-effective clean energy resources now, and to
405 encourage them to achieve scales of significance. Future compliance costs for the state’s
406 utilities associated with the *Clean Power Plan* can be mitigated by now adopting strong,
407 scalable clean energy policies, including robust TOU tariffs.

408 **Q. Will a TOU rate benefit all customers in Illinois, including low-income households?**

409 A. Yes. TOU rate pricing provides an extra path to reduce electricity bills. Since low-
410 income households expend a greater proportion of their income on energy than do higher-
411 income households,²⁰ they are more *willing* to shift load and conserve, even if they are
412 less *able* to do so. TOU rates offer a pathway for such willing households without
413 requiring an upfront cost investment. Likewise, my work with families located near
414 power plants – who tend to be lower-income – suggests TOU rates can reduce air
415 emissions in disadvantaged communities by relieving pressures on highly polluting
416 “peaker” generation resources. This motivation may be reflected in relatively high
417 adoption levels for low-income households in other jurisdictions, such as PG&E’s
418 SmartRate tariff.²¹

419 **Q. Have the impacts of TOU rates on low-income customers been documented?**

420 A. Yes. Analysis has demonstrated TOU and other time-variant rates can result in cost and
421 energy savings to low-income households. For example, in 2008, Connecticut Light &
422 Power conducted its “Plan-it Wise Energy” program, a pilot with 1,251 customers. This
423 program tested three dynamic rates, including two TOU rates with different price levels
424 (high and low). Researchers found no statistical difference in the response of low-income
425 and non-low-income customers who were switched to TOU rates. Low-income
426 customers saved an average of \$8.07 over the course of three months:

427

²⁰ Stephen Morris, Nancy Devlin, & David Parkin, *Economic Analysis in Health Care* 153 (2007).

²¹2012 Rate Design Window Application of Pac. Gas & Elec., A. 12-02-020 App. A Vol. 1 at 46 (E-Filing Cal. P.U.C. Feb. 29, 2012)(application of Pac. Gas & Elec.), https://www.pge.com/regulation/RateDesignWindow2012/Testimony/PGE/2012/RateDesignWindow2012_Test_PGE_20120229_230078.pdf.

Connecticut Pilot, TOU Rate Impacts on Low-Income Customers²²

Pricing Plan	Peak Price (per kWh)	Off-Peak Price (per kWh)	Avg. Low-income Usage Reduction	Avg. Low-income Bill Savings (Jun 1-Aug 31)²³
High TOU	34¢	14¢	4%	\$8.07
Low TOU	27¢	17¢	2%	

428

429

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433

In Maryland, researchers tested a variety of dynamic rates and technologies with 1,375 residential customers as part of Baltimore Gas & Electric’s Smart Energy Pricing Pilot. That study used a “dynamic peak pricing tariff” (“DPP”) - a TOU rate with CPP events. As shown in the table below, the pilot found no statistical difference between low-income and high-income customers in their response to the rates.

Maryland Pricing Pilot “DPP” (TOU + CPP) Pricing Scheme²⁴

Pricing Plan	Peak Price (per kWh)	Off-Peak Price (per kWh)	Avg. Low-income Usage Reduction
Fixed-Rate	15¢	15¢	--
TOU	14¢	9¢	20%
CPP event	\$1.30	9¢	20%

434

435

436

437

It is important to note that these cost savings do not require turning off air conditioning on hot days or being cold on frigid ones. Rather, customers can use programmable thermostats to precool or pre-heat the house and can simply avoid unnecessary electricity

²² Faruqui, Ahmad and Sanem Sergici, *Impact Evaluation of NU’s Plan-It Wise Energy Program: Final Results*, November 2, 2009.

²³ Docket No. 05-10-03RE01, *Results of CL&P Plan-It Wise Energy Pilot*, CL&P Compliance Filing (Order No. 4), 4.

²⁴ Ahmad Faruqui, Sanem Sergici, and Jennifer Palmer, *The Impact of Dynamic Pricing on Low Income Customers (Updated September 2010)*, 16.

438 use during peak-price times. Low-income households have less ability to make upfront
439 investments in clean energy improvements, such as installing solar panels or
440 weatherization due to split incentives and diminished access to credit or capital. This is
441 why I recommend a TOU rate be deployed on an opt-in basis and in conjunction with
442 existing Illinois efforts to deploy smart devices to customers.

443 **Q. Can the Commission see TOU rates as related to grid modernization?**

444 A. Wider adoption of TOU rates should be seen as a fundamental part of the evolution of the
445 grid as it becomes more customer-centric and flexible. TOU rates can enliven energy
446 management services and third-party providers to help manage the electricity system,
447 akin to supply side participants. As climate change demands new resiliency and
448 adaptability, TOU rates can adapt to changing loads, costs and grid conditions, inviting
449 ratepayers to play a beneficial role in rebalancing the grid and reducing its associated
450 environmental impacts.

451 **Q. Why are you recommending that only utilities participating in the EIMA be**
452 **directed to offer a TOU rate?**

453 A. A TOU rate depends on having interval metering, that is, the ability to record electricity
454 usage at specific times of day. Thus, a necessary condition is advanced metering like that
455 which ComEd and Ameren are deploying as part of their participation in the EIMA. It's
456 my understanding that this deployment means that they are eligible to "participate" in the
457 EIMA by having their rates set through an annual, performance-based rate rather than a
458 traditional test year.

459

460

461 **II. DESIGNING A TIME OF USE RATE FOR ILLINOIS**

462 **Q. How should a TOU rate be designed to provide the benefits described in the section**
463 **above?**

464 A. A utility is well positioned to create the precise design of a TOU rate, and the rate itself
465 should adjust as energy supply and demand changes over the course of time. Yet several
466 significant “elements” are common to any well designed TOU rate. One good example is
467 the “Smart Home Rate” designed in partnership with a broad range of stakeholders,
468 including San Diego Gas & Electric, Sunverge, Rocky Mountain Institute, and Google.
469 Designed to “enable new technologies and practices and to reveal their costs and benefits
470 to the grid,”²⁵ this rate is founded upon a structure that ensures fair compensation to
471 “customers, the utility, and third-party participants for the full range of services they
472 provide.” It uses a day-ahead hourly price signal (“\$/kWh”) that allows customers to
473 utilize technologies to avoid periods of high costs/high demand and to benefit from
474 utilizing energy during negative pricing events that occur when loads are low and
475 renewable supplies are high.²⁶ \This vision is similarly articulated in a Rocky Mountain
476 Institute (“RMI”) white paper that identifies three dimensions – i.e. design elements - by
477 which smart rates might be differentiated:²⁷

- 478 • Attribute unbundling – break down energy, capacity, ancillary services, and other
479 components and price them explicitly;
- 480 • Temporal granularity – shift from flat or block rates to pricing that differentiates
481 time-based value of generation and consumption; and

²⁵ Rocky Mountain Institute’s eLab at www.rmi.org/eLab.

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ Devi Glick, *et al.*, *Rate Design for the Distribution Edge: Electricity Pricing for a Distributed Resource Future*, Rocky Mountain Institute Electricity Innovation Lab (Aug. 2014).

- 482 • Locational granularity – offer pricing that provides geographically differentiated
483 incentives for distributed energy resources.

484 **Q. How do these dimensions relate to the design of a TOU rate?**

485 A. A TOU rate should be designed to encourage broad adoption by consumers, while at the
486 same time taking into account the transparency in pricing “smart rates” like those
487 discussed by RMI. This can be achieved with a number of different structures, ranging
488 from opt-out TOU rates to opt-in TOU rates (the latter, as noted above, has been
489 successful in Arizona, where utilities offered an opt-in TOU tariff that over 50 percent of
490 residential customers have chosen to join).²⁸

491 **Q. Please describe the best practices and principles for designing a TOU rate.**

492 A. TOU rates must give necessary price signals and actionable solutions for customers to
493 save money and for the electric system to shift demand to non-peak and lower-priced
494 times. The theory and evidence provided above indicate that (1) consumers want and are
495 able to act as empowered decision makers, (2) a well-structured TOU rate can protect
496 customers and provide system benefits, and (3) it is desirable to facilitate more
497 transparency in pricing goods and services on the grid. Thus, any TOU rate adopted must
498 be designed to allow for these results. To that end, there are some basic principles that
499 should be kept in mind when a TOU tariff is designed:

- 500 • Rates should provide transparent and actionable price signals;
501 • Rates should be based on marginal cost;
502 • Rates should encourage conservation and energy efficiency;

²⁸ Leland Snook, *APS's Time-of-Use Rates & What's Next for Arizona?* California Public Utilities Commission Residential Rate Rulemaking Workshop: Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Time Variant Pricing, R. 12-06-013, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Electric+Rates/Time+Variant+Pricing_TVP.htm.

- 503 • Rates should encourage reduction of both coincident and non-coincident peak
504 demand;
- 505 • Rates should be stable and understandable and provide customer choice; and
- 506 • Rates should encourage economically efficient decision making.²⁹

507 **Q. Why are price signals important in electric rate design?**

508 **A.** Customers need transparent information about products and services – particularly about
509 prices – to make rational purchasing decisions.³⁰ Electricity is no different. Customers
510 need the same clear information about their energy use as they do for any other purchase,
511 such as how they plan their meal purchases at the grocery store. Nobel Prize winning
512 economist William Vickrey compared flat-rate electricity pricing that most consumers
513 experience to a supermarket charging the same price for ground beef and filet mignon,
514 and a resultant shortage of filet mignon. An electricity customer should be given a
515 similar opportunity to determine their consumption based on price. Given the social and
516 environmental consequences of energy production, pricing that reflects economic, social,
517 and environmental costs is especially important if consumers are to be enabled to make
518 fully informed choices.³¹

519 **Q. How are price signals most effective in motivating a response?**

520 **A.** For prices to be most effective in motivating good decisions, they must be readily
521 transparent. Information must be clear in terms of the cost per kWh at a given point in
522 time and how much electricity is needed for a given household task. Transparent
523 electricity pricing requires that, to the extent possible, consumers know the price of each

²⁹ Regulatory Assistance Project, *Designing Distributed Generation Tariffs Well: Fair Compensation in a Time of Transition*, 2013, available at www.raponline.org/document/download/id/6898.

³⁰ Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston & Jerry Green. *Microeconomic Theory* 20 (1995).

³¹ T. H. Tietenberg, *Environmental and Natural Resource Economics* 67 (5th ed. 1999).

524 kWh unit of electricity they use.³² They should also have access to basic information
525 about what the kWh usage is of basic appliances and tasks, for example like air
526 conditioning.

527 **Q. Is there evidence that consumers are likely to act on transparent electricity pricing?**

528 **A.** Yes. As noted in Section I above, consumers consistently seize on opportunities to save
529 money, and many are motivated additionally to reduce their environmental footprints.
530 They will make rational purchasing decisions when given the opportunity, and electricity
531 is no exception. For example, consumers have embraced the rapid penetration of
532 fluorescent light bulb technology, full subscription in solar incentive programs, and
533 initiatives, such as California’s FlexAlert, that obtain quick reductions in electricity use
534 when needed to avoid outages. The evidence says that customers not only can, but want
535 the opportunity to, act on more transparent energy prices. A recent survey of nearly
536 5,000 customers by PG&E and So Cal Edison found that 75 percent have tried shifting
537 their energy use already – even though they receive no financial rewards to do so. As
538 well, 70% said they would be willing to risk higher bills for the chance to realize bill
539 decreases.³³ This willingness, combined with thoughtful policies – such as bill protection
540 that prohibits bill shocks for up to one year after a customer changes rate plans, and the
541 ability to opt-out – strongly suggests that ratepayers (and their service providers) will
542 take advantage of information and capabilities of digital electricity meters and automated
543 “set-it-and-forget-it” learning thermostats, to employ best practices and to be a part of a
544 cleaner, more efficient energy system while reducing their own energy bills.


³² W. Nicholson, *Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions* 245 (7th ed. 1998).

³³ Hiner & Partners, Pac. Gas & Elec., S. Cal. Edison, & San Diego Gas & Elec., *RROIR Customer Survey Key Findings* 11, 43 (April 16, 2013).

545 **Q. Does real-world evidence exist that indicates that customers who participate in a**
546 **TOU rate actually like the experience?**

547 A. Yes. When customer bills change in understandable, predictable, and actionable ways –
548 particularly when paired with education and attractive, accessible technology – customer
549 satisfaction improves.³⁴ At the same time, experience validates the common sense
550 understanding that energy users don't like bill surprises, but will change their behavior,
551 or adopt new technology, if presented with the right incentives, or reasons, to do so. The
552 aforementioned SMUD program supports these findings, showing that consumers prefer
553 a well-designed TOU rate, as illustrated in the graph below:
554

³⁴ This technology could include but is not limited to: advanced automatic load control devices, colorful signals that remind ratepayers to shift their load to take advantage of lower cost periods, and devices and practices that will not be fully developed until the right pricing structures are in place, such as precooling on peak demand afternoons paired with intensive weatherization and rooftop PV generation, and financing mechanisms that front load benefits for customers and remove the need for them to dynamically respond (e.g., set it and forget it).



555

556 **Q. How does the length of the time periods impact a TOU rate's effectiveness?**

557 **A.** The structure of a TOU rate impacts its value proposition for customers. This means it
558 impacts how many customers shift their usage and by what percent that usage is shifted.
559 For example, when the peak period is short (i.e. less hours) or the ratio of peak to off-
560 peak prices is shallow (i.e. price differentials between prices are small), shifting of
561 electricity consumption has less of an impact on monthly energy bills. Conversely, with
562 a longer peak period, there is greater risk of using energy during that period, but also
563 more value from shifting away from peak time usage. As an example, if the peak price is
564 twice the off-peak price (i.e., ratio equals two), under a four-hour peak window, 30
565 percent shifting results in almost twice as much bill reduction (relative to no shifting
566 behavior) as under a two-hour peak window. A household's ability to shift between time

567 periods decreases as the peak window increases. Thus, load shifting behavior is less
568 likely under a four-hour peak window than under a two-hour peak window.

569 **Q. What else impacts a customer's response to a TOU rate?**

570 A. In addition to the length of a TOU rate's price windows, the amount of shifting that
571 would occur under a TOU rate schedule depends on the customer's awareness and the
572 household's ability to change its behavior. Utilities can significantly influence such
573 behavior by increasing education and helping individuals adopt set-it-and-forget-it
574 technologies.

575 **Q. Would a TOU rate be consistent with previous ICC guidance on rate design
576 principles regarding cost causation?**

577 A. Yes. In docket No. 10-0467, the Commission noted the importance to "design rates that
578 reflect cost causation."³⁵ TOU pricing, as noted above, reflects marginal costs with more
579 precision than flat rate pricing, and extensive evidence demonstrates that electricity
580 service costs vary over the course of a day, week, and season. The following graph
581 shows how PG&E incorporates such varying costs when it calculates the value of
582 distributed energy resources.³⁶

³⁵ *In Re Commonwealth Edison Co.*, Final Order, ICC Docket No. 10-0467, at 232 (May 24, 2011).

³⁶ Pac. Gas & Elec., *Time Dependent Valuation (TDV) Economics Methodology* 8 fig. 1 (2002), http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/2005standards/archive/rulemaking/documents/tdv/TDV_ECON_METHOD_EXTRACT.PDF.

Extract of March 18, 2002 Report




Figure 1 - TDV Costing Compared to Flat Costing – summer weekday

583

584 **Q. Would a TOU rate be consistent with previous ICC guidance on rate design**
585 **principles pertaining to cost allocation?**

586 **A.** Yes. In ICC Docket No. 13-0387, the Commission concluded it was

587 “not reasonable or consistent with public policy to structure rates so that
588 the poor, the frugal and the energy efficient are required to subsidize those
589 who are not, when a more equitable method of allocation exists. A more
590 reasonable policy allocates the same aggregate costs so that individual
591 customer costs are reasonably proportionate to the costs that their use
592 places on the system.”³⁷

593 As TOU rates are closer to marginal cost-based pricing than flat or tiered rates, they
594 better satisfy economic efficiency for both consumers and producers, while meeting
595 conservation and consumer goals.

596 **Q. Would a TOU rate be consistent with the Commission’s interest in an open access**
597 **data framework?**

³⁷ *In Re Commonwealth Edison Company*, Final Order, ICC Docket No. 13-0387, at 75 (Dec. 18, 2013).

598 **A.** Yes. Customers can be empowered to manage their energy usage if they have both access
599 to their usage data as well as access to market signals that highlight the actual costs of
600 generating and delivering electricity. The Commission's ongoing efforts associated with
601 an open access data framework complement the adoption of TOU rates.

602 **Q. Is there a particular TOU rate design that you recommend the Commission**
603 **consider?**

604 **A.** Yes. Because the greatest value of a TOU rate lies in its ability to encourage customers
605 to shift their usage away from expensive periods which rely on the most polluting
606 sources, I recommend the Commission direct the utilities to offer a TOU rate which
607 would have three blocks: on-peak for highest demand times; off-peak for periods of less
608 demand; and super off-peak for when demand is minimal. The time periods could be in a
609 1:3:2 ratio – e.g. 4 hours of peak time, 12 hours of off-peak time and 8 hours of super off-
610 peak time – with prices in each period reflecting the marginal rates in those periods.

611

612 **III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEPLOYING A TOU RATE**

613 **Q. Have other TOU programs delivered the benefits discussed in Section I?**

614 **A.** Yes. As discussed in Section I, substantial empirical evidence shows the benefits
615 possible through a TOU rate. Well-designed, well-implemented variant rates have
616 consistently lowered peak load and received high marks in customer satisfaction.

617 **Q. Are there specific elements of the TOU rates you or others have reviewed that**
618 **influence peak load reduction and customer satisfaction?**

619 A. Yes. A higher peak to off-peak price ratio results in a higher peak load reduction.³⁸

620 Generally, enrollment is much higher when customers are defaulted into TOU rates when
621 compare to opt-in programs; this is partly a function of “choice architecture” whereby
622 most consumers can’t be troubled to either opt-in or opt-out, so the status quo dominates.

623 **Q. Do you have any recommendations for how a TOU rate could be successfully**
624 **implemented and deployed in Illinois?**

625 A. Yes. A TOU program must be implemented with the right amount and type of consumer
626 education, outreach, and enablement. Factors that should be considered include:

- 627 • *Communicate with consumers early and often, through multiple means and*
628 *channels.* Thoughtful, consistent, diversely-conveyed messages about the new
629 rates and their benefits should be launched well in advance of their
630 implementation, and continue through the transition period.
- 631 • *Adopt integrated approaches using multiple tactics.* Every Commission-
632 funded, utility-sponsored ratepayer “touch” should include mention of the new
633 rate opportunities and support services, with the web of tactics carefully
634 mapped to ensure that overlapping strategies complement one another.
- 635 • *Segment the market, implementing tailored approaches for particular*
636 *customer groups.* Utilities should continue to build on the significant progress
637 they’ve made in segmenting the residential class into synergistic groups – by
638 income, race, ethnicity, use patterns, and location, among other variables –
639 and harness those segments as part of effective education strategies.
- 640 • *Shape tactics to local contexts.* The utilities should restructure their marketing
641 and outreach efforts as needed so that they are nested alongside their
642 distribution planning boundaries and defining community characteristics.
- 643 • *Demonstrate tangible and immediate benefits rather than “general*
644 *awareness” messaging.* Highlighting early adopters who have achieved
645 significant bill savings as a result of TOU rate structures is an example of
646 demonstrable benefits. Showing clear examples is preferable to generalized
647 messaging.
- 648 • *Strive for consistent messaging, to ensure accuracy of information, repetition*
649 *of key concepts, and cohesion across the multiple messengers.* The messenger
650 and messaging can and should change. Utilities should foster an ability to

³⁸ See Faruqui et al., *Arcturus: International Evidence on Dynamic Pricing*, The Brattle Group, July 1, 2013.

651 monitor communication efforts by diverse parties where they meet the
652 customer in order to maintain quality.

- 653 • *An emphasis on customer service and satisfaction is critical.* The
654 communication effort should not be one-way. Messengers and customers
655 should be encouraged to provide early feedback on tariffs and associated
656 programs so that real and perceived issues can be effectively addressed.

657 **Q. Why should Illinois utilities begin by offering a TOU rate as an opt-in program?**

658 A. It is important that a TOU rate be one of several time-variant rate offerings from ComEd
659 and Ameren, and it's my understanding that all of the current offerings are ones where
660 customers opt into the pricing program. There are strategies by which a utility could
661 default new customers onto a TOU rate, such as enrolling customers who open new
662 accounts. While the majority of customers will be structural winners (i.e., without any
663 load shifting or conservation practices, they will enjoy a bill reduction when moved from
664 a flat to a TOU rate), it is important to determine what education and enablement is
665 needed to assist non-structural winners in managing their bills before they are moved to a
666 TOU rate.

667 **Q. What are elements of a successful customer engagement program to encourage**
668 **TOU rate participation and satisfaction?**

669 A. The aforementioned SMUD, PowerCents D.C, and APS³⁹ experiences, as well as the
670 study summary findings by Faruqui et al,⁴⁰ lead to some basic principles:

³⁹ See generally Jennifer Potter, *SMUD's SmartPricing Options Marketing Strategy*, California Public Utilities Commission Residential Rate Rulemaking Workshop: Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Time Variant Pricing, R. 12-06-013,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Electric+Rates/Time+Variant+Pricing_TVP.htm;

Leland Snook, *APS's Time-of-Use Rates & What's Next for Arizona?* California Public Utilities Commission Residential Rate Rulemaking Workshop: Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Time Variant Pricing, R. 12-06-013,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Electric+Rates/Time+Variant+Pricing_TVP.htm.

- 671 • Work with thought leaders in communities and a diversity of marketing and
672 outreach avenues;
- 673 • Be open to third parties capable of more effectively and efficiently engaging
674 customers and reaching “hard to reach” customers; and
- 675 • Identify customers with load profiles that indicate the need for energy
676 management (due to either very high total use or high peak use) and treat
677 these customers as intelligent beings with smart technologies capable of
678 shifting and reducing load in response to signals.

679 **Q. Are there specific strategies Illinois should consider during the testing of a TOU**
680 **rate?**

681 A. Yes. Several strategies should be considered:

- 682 • Use best practices for outreach and marketing TOU tariffs and associated
683 programs as learned from other TOU programs.
- 684 • Use “shadow” billing, where customers are given information on what they
685 would have paid under a flat rate as compared to the TOU rate. Shadow bills
686 can help customers understand the opportunities and risks presented by time-
687 variant rate structures with respect to their individual use patterns and
688 potential to changes to those patterns. Providing shadow bills for several
689 months or years will help customers plan for and adjust to the potential for bill
690 volatility. These bills need not be presented in paper form as part of bill
691 inserts, but rather be easily accessible through web or mobile interfaces. This
692 “*Try-it-Before-You-Buy-It*” approach and associated education could be
693 provided along with directed customer energy management assistance.
694 Likewise, in addition to bill limit protection, customers could be allowed to
695 switch to alternative rates if they choose to do so.
- 696 • Ensure low-income customers are provided with every opportunity to benefit
697 from TOU rates. These opportunities include increased access to newer,
698 energy efficient appliances that enhance readiness to adopt strategies
699 beneficial for customers on TOU rates.
- 700 • Provide a period of bill protection after the switch to TOU rates, particularly if
701 shadow billing suggests a customer may experience a bill increase.
- 702 • Provide customers who voluntarily enroll in TOU rates with set-it-and-forget
703 technologies. Recent analyses, including in the Sacramento Municipal Utility
704 District’s service territory, indicate that the provision of advanced thermostats
705 – user-friendly thermostats that enable customers to program precooling and
706 offsets for daily TOU peak load shifting, and display real-time electricity rates

⁴⁰ Ahmad Faruqui and Jenny Palmer. *The Discovery of Price Responsiveness – A Survey of Experiments Involving Dynamic Pricing of Electricity*. EDI Quarterly, March 12, 2012.

707 and home energy data – can significantly increase energy users’ ability to
708 respond to price signals.⁴¹ It’s my understanding the Commission has already
709 directed ComEd and Ameren to make the piloting of in-home devices a part of
710 the utility energy efficiency programs. Such programs could be coupled with
711 efforts aimed at enrolling those customers the utilities identify as most likely
712 to save money on a TOU rate.

713 **Q. When should customers be approached to enroll in a TOU rate?**

714 A. Perhaps the most convenient time to enroll customers in TOU rates and associated
715 programs is when they sign up for electric service. APS and SRP have used these
716 opportunities to drive enrollment in their pricing programs, helping these utilities achieve
717 high participation rates of 50 percent and 22 percent, respectively. APS presents all
718 pricing plans as equal and helps customers identify which rates best suits them, rather
719 than leading with their basic service plan and promoting other plans only as alternatives
720 to this lead offer. Given APS’s high customer turnover, this acquisition strategy has been
721 instrumental in achieving high enrollment, with the majority of program participants
722 enrolling during the electricity sign-up process. APS’ success suggests that customers
723 are not inherently opposed to pricing programs and can be enrolled in large numbers.⁴²

724 **Q. How can the Commission ensure low-income customers benefit from a TOU rate?**

725 A. To ensure diverse constituencies benefit from TOU rates, the Commission should ensure:

- 726 • *Appropriate education and outreach:* Targeted outreach that meets the needs
727 of non-English, disabled, and other consumers.
- 728 • *Access to Enabling Technologies:* Ensure customers have access to enabling
729 devices, such as thermostats, before enrollment in TOU rates.
- 730 • *Air Conditioning:* AC is the single most important driver of success under
731 TOU rates during summer peaks – and a well-designed approach is critical to
732 maintaining the well-being of consumers. Strategies might include saturating

⁴¹ Herter Energy Res. Solutions, *SMUD’s Residential Summer Solution* (Feb. 2012).

⁴² *Id.* at 25.

733 certain regions and household types with enabling devices capable, perhaps
734 with financing for more efficient air conditioners.

735 • *Access to Energy Improvement Programs:* Because of the financial barriers
736 some customers face, there is an untapped reservoir of energy and cost
737 savings in households, including plug load dominated by older, inefficient,
738 devices. These households could benefit from increased financing of energy
739 improvements by leveraging existing energy efficiency and appliance
740 replacement programs and supporting access to distributed generation options.

741 **Q. How will the Commission know that a TOU rate is actually resulting in benefits to**
742 **Illinois customers?**

743 A. As discussed earlier, a TOU rate should be designed to meet specific goals, and success
744 can be based upon whether those rates are meeting explicit metrics. The Commission
745 should plan for the collection of data that enables utilities, the Commission, and other
746 stakeholders to evaluate the efficacy of rate structures and to modify policies and
747 programs. The refinement of TOU rates should be an ongoing, adaptive process with
748 specific, measurable, time-specified objectives, appropriate metrics to evaluate progress,
749 and a clear game plan for adjustments. Thoughtful tracking, evaluation and adaptation
750 will be especially significant for particularly vulnerable customer classes.

751 **Q. Do you have specific recommendations on what would inform the Commission, and**
752 **all stakeholders, that a TOU rate is in fact providing benefits to Illinois customers?**

753 A. Yes. The Commission should adopt robust metrics and associated performance indicators
754 that accompany the transition to TOU rates. CUB, EDF and ComEd have already put in
755 place metrics associated with metrics requiring reporting of customers on TOU rate,
756 HAN penetration, use of utility web-based portals, authorizations to share information
757 with third parties, smart meter related consumer complaints, consumers enrolled in

758 electric vehicle tariffs, and various aspects of consumer-owned distributed generation.⁴³

759 These metrics should be expanded to include consumer education and load flexibility

760 resource needs in order to inform specific aspects of the TOU rate policy and refine it

761 over time. The environmental benefits of time variant rates can be tracked by

762 determining:

763 • Changes in load shapes and bills, along with underlying household
764 characteristics;

765 • Changes in generation mix emissions intensity; and

766 • Changes in the quality and level of services and technologies that aid in
767 conservation and shifting.

768 These metrics should be carefully tracked, tied to a utility's performance-based

769 compensation, and used to continually improve upon the policies, programs, and tariffs

770 recommended in this proceeding. For that reason I think a TOU rate is best

771 implemented as a multi-year pilot, the approach that I understand was done with the

772 other time-variant rates offered by ComEd and Ameren.

773 **Q. What kind of tracking should the utilities do as part of this pilot?**

774 A. Utilities should monitor ongoing research that evaluates the impacts of TOU rates on

775 energy usage, customer investment in distributed energy resources, customer bills, and

776 environmental outcomes (such as avoided GHG pollution). This means measuring the

777 impacts of specific interventions, such as those technologies noted earlier and educational

778 programs. Identifying interventions that help control bill impacts and improve

779 conservation and shifting will result in more cost reductions by eliminating costly

⁴³ *In Re Commonwealth Edison Company*, Final Order, ICC Docket No. 12-0298, at 19 (June 22, 2012).

780 programs or interventions that do not help achieve desired outcomes while promoting
781 those that do.

782 **Q. Why is ongoing monitoring and research important?**

783 A. Some households will better adapt to a new TOU rate than others – particularly given
784 different characteristics such as income, location, appliance mix, access to information,
785 and other factors. Understanding which households benefit most from TOU rates, and
786 identifying ways to maximize savings across different types of households, is essential to
787 achieving the full benefits of energy pricing. Likewise, new rate structures may be
788 regularly introduced over the next decade, as the grid evolves towards a new equilibrium,
789 creating the need for constant evaluation, feedback loops, and adaptive management.

790 **Q. How can the utilities inform the Commission of the impacts of a TOU rate?**

791 A. Energy consumption data should be gathered from a sample of households and matched
792 with a census of household characteristics. This information can be used to document
793 changes in customer segment and marketplace behavior, enabling policymakers and
794 utilities to continually hone their efforts to develop effective rate structures, financing
795 programs, and targeted distributed energy resources initiatives. A variety of different
796 household characteristics and outcomes of interest are listed in the table below.

797 **Table 1: Household Characteristics and Outcomes of Interest**

Household Characteristics	Outcomes of Interest
Demographics (income, race, location)	Investments in energy efficiency, appliances, self-generation, weatherization
Opt-in vs. Default TOU	Shifting in household energy consumption from peak to off-peak

Household Characteristics	Outcomes of Interest
Appliances and HVAC (other than electricity generators and vehicles)	Market segmentation and valuation of efficiency, and communication capabilities (e.g., Wifi enabled, programmable, clock)
Vulnerable Customers	Bill Impacts (Change in bill before and implementation)
High vs. Low Energy Users	Gradual transition from high to low energy use
Peaky vs. Flat Load Energy Users	Shifting from peak to off peak for flatter diurnal usage patterns (aka, flattening load factor)
Solar PV	Net present value and rate on investment; Utility cost recovery
Electric Vehicles	Super off peak charging, obtain value out of demand response, storage and ancillary services
Storage	Obtain value out of demand response, storage and ancillary services

798

799 **Q. What is your final recommendation?**

800 A. I recommend the Commission direct the utilities to offer a TOU rate that would have
 801 three blocks: on-peak for highest demand times; off-peak for periods of less demand; and
 802 super off-peak for when demand is minimal. The time periods could be in a 1:3:2 ratio –
 803 e.g. 4 hours of peak time, 12 hours of off-peak time and 8 hours of super off-peak time –
 804 with prices in each period reflecting the marginal costs of service in those periods. This
 805 tariff should be offered on an opt-in basis, and implemented with an emphasis on
 806 customer education and engagement.

807 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

808 A. Yes.